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The Absence of the Rule of Law in
Mexico: Diagnosis and Implications for a
Mexican Transition to Democracy
ALICIA ELY YAMIN, ESQ.* AND
MA. PILAR NORIEGA GARCiA, ESQ.**
"We don't have conditions for security; we don't have the rule
of law that is required for Mexico to develop. ..
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mexico, perhaps more than in any Latin American
country, the overwhelming dominance of the one-party state has
emasculated and discredited the judicial branch of government.
Seven decades of political manipulation and institutional neglect
have created a notoriously corrupt and politicized Mexican judicial
system. It is only recently that the Mexican Government (the
Government), following the World Bank's directives, began
emphasizing the importance of the rule of law, linking it to security
and economic development issues.2 For example, upon taking
* J.D., Harvard Law School; MPH, Harvard School of Public Health. Ms. Yamin is
currently Assistant Professor and Staff Attorney at the Law & Policy Project at Columbia
School of Public Health
** Lic. en Derecho, Escuela Libre de Derecho. Ms. Noriega is currently in private
practice at Servicios Legales, Informaci6n y Estudios Jurfdicos, A.C. in Mexico City.
1. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n, Address at the 60th Mexican National
Banking Convention, (Mar. 7,1997).
2. Note a recent World Bank statement on the matter: "Economic reform requires a
well-functioning judiciary which can interpret and apply the laws and regulations in a
predictable and efficient manner.... In addition, the increase in economic integration
between countries and regions demands a judiciary that meets international standards."
MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
ELEMENTS OF REFORM 3 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996). See also,
Inicitaiva Presidencial de Reformas al Poder Judicial y la Administraci6n de Justicia
Constitucional, Presidencia de la Reptiblica, Palacio Nacional, Mexico, Dec. 5, 1994
[hereinafter Iniciativa], cited in Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
office in December 1994, one of President Zedillo's first official
acts was to introduce a set of constitutional and legislative reforms
aimed ostensibly at promoting the rule of law. 3
Unfortunately, human rights initiatives were conspicuously
absent from the Government's legislative agenda for judicial
reform. Legislative proposals made over the past five years have
shifted the focus of Mexican criminal law from protecting
individual rights to instituting governmental controls. These
reforms and initiatives played a major role toward
institutionalization of the arbitrary and abusive practices of the
police, public prosecutors and judiciary.4
The objective of this article is to examine the weaknesses of
the rule of law in Mexico. Part II establishes the context for rising
violence and human rights violations in Mexico by exploring how
at the macro-level, public safety issues have been merged into
national security issues, and how at the micro-level, individual
rights have been abrogated in the judicial process.
Part III provides an overview of the judicial process in Mexico
and discusses the amparo mechanism, the principal remedy
available to defendants for violations of their individual rights.
Part IV focuses on the judiciary itself, examining its role in the
perpetuation of torture as an institutionalized practice among law
enforcement in Mexico; and discusses why recent judicial reforms
failed to establish authentic judicial independence. Part V
discusses recent reforms in the criminal procedure codes as well in
the Mexican Constitution (the Constitution). Specifically, the
article considers pre-trial detention, the right to counsel, and the
expansion of prosecutorial discretion. One point becomes clear
after examining the reforms; expansion of the Public Prosecutor's
Mexico: An Appraisal of President Zedillo's Judicial Reform of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 295,296 (1996).
3. See "Decreto mediante el cual se declaran reformados los articulos 21, 55, 73, 76,
79, 89, 93, 94,95,96, 97, 98,99, 100, 101,102,103, 104, 105,106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 116, 122
y 123 de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos," D.O., 31 de diciembre
de 1994 (Mex.) (amending 27 articles of Mexico's Political Constitution, effective January
1,1995).
4. In introducing the reforms of December of 1997, the Zedillo Administration
stated that "after four years of applying the new constitutional text, an equilibrium
between crime, prosecution and the right of subjects to freedom has not yet been
reached." CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS "MIGUEL AGUSTiN PRO JUAREZ," LA
NUEVA REFORMA PENAL: LEGALIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD 4 (1998) [hereinafter
LEGALIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD].
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role has had a detrimental effect on the goal of eliminating
systemic human rights abuses.
II. POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
MEXICO: THE STRUCTURAL NATURE OF VIOLENCE AND THE
ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
At the close of the Twentieth Century, Mexico finds itself
undergoing tremendous political and social upheaval as the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party's (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI)) hold on power slowly deteriorates. While
promising stories of electoral reform and electoral gains by
opposition parties become common, drug-related violence,
political assassinations, and the proliferation of rebel groups also
dominate the headlines. In the wake of the decline of the "the
perfect dictatorship" (a term coined by Mario Vargas Llosa), the
resulting vacuum of power has left Mexico in a virtual state of
crisis. The unraveling of the PRI signals some important
opportunities for the emergence of a culture focused on human
rights and the strengthening of civil society. Most significantly, the
decline of the PRI creates the possibility of establishing an
authentic multi-party democracy in Mexico. The July 1997
elections saw the election of the first plural congress in the nation's
history. Opposition parties continue to gain control over state and
local government, most notably the mayoralty of Mexico City.
5
On the other hand, the "Mexican transition to democracy"
runs the risk of creating a national security crisis. Government
officials often refer to the impending public security crisis and the
threat to national sovereignty. 6 The rise in violence that Mexico
experienced in recent years is used to justify reforms that restrict
individual rights. Indeed, backed by the legal sanction of the
Supreme Court, the Government's militarization of many
previously civilian law enforcement activities has had a markedly
deleterious effect not only on human rights, but on the rule of law
itself.
5. Other political changes are notable as well. For example, for the first time in
history, the PRI may use primary elections, rather than the dedazo, which is the hand-
picked appointment of incumbents, to select its candidate for the presidential elections in
2000. See Sam Dillon, Mexicans' Radical New Politics: Top Party May Adopt Primaries,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1998, at Al.
6. See MASSIMO PAVAINI, CONTROL Y DOMINACION 166-67 (1983).
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A. Rise in Violence and Nature and Sources of Violence
In recent years Mexico has witnessed a dramatic rise in
violent crime. This violence is perhaps most noticeable in Mexico
City. Sam Dillon writes in The New York Times:
Although record-keeping is chaotic, and fear of the police keeps
many victims from reporting crimes, government statistics for
Mexico City show that reported murders rose by 50 percent
from 1990 to 1995 and that robbery incidents have multiplied
six-fold in 15 years. Experts estimate that kidnappings in
Mexico, once rare, now number at least 1,500 a year.
7
In the North, drugs, corruption, and violence are now
endemic. In the South, paramilitary violence has become
increasingly lethal. 8
While some large capital owners benefited from the 1980's
and 1990's deregulation of financial markets, liberalization of trade
rules, and privatization of state-owned industries, the great
majority of Mexicans suffered tremendous social dislocation. The
subsequent poverty spawned much of the violence prevalent in
Mexico today. The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) notes that "the share of the population living in absolute
poverty increased from 19% in 1984 to 24% in 1989." 9 Between
1989 and 1992, in rural areas, where the majority of people live in
absolute poverty, the number of absolute poor increased from 6.7
million to 8.8 million. The UNDP estimates that today "more than
30% of the rural population lives below the income poverty
line." 10 While there is little data on the period since the December
1994 peso collapse, the UNDP calculates that poverty levels have
almost certainly worsened. The UNDP attributes the increased
poverty, in part, to the fact that more than one million Mexicans
lost their jobs in the aftermath of the crisis. 11
The Government's economic austerity measures have directly
affected individual violence. Professor and criminologist, Rafael
Ruiz Harrell, has tabulated annual figures for all reported crimes
7. See Sam Dillon, Mexico Can't Fathom its Rising Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1998, at 4-1.
8. See RED DE DERECHOS HUMANOS TODOS LOS DERECHOS PARA TODOS,
REPORT ON MASSACRE AT ACTEAL (1998).
9. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 1997 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 88 (1997).
10. Id.
11. See id.
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since 1930; Harrell observes:
There's a clear association between economic crisis and crime.
• . [B]eginning in 1983, the first year after an economic crisis
sent wages into free-fall, crime rates took off, and they have yet
to level out. In 1995, the year following the disastrous peso
devaluation, reported crimes in Mexico surged 35 percent.1 7
In rural areas, the Government's political and economic
policies have had an even more profound effect on violence and
the underlying social fabric of communities. In the early 1990's, in
preparation for the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) negotiations, the Government passed constitutional
reforms that allowed for the privatization of land. Those reforms
opened vast sectors of Mexican farmland up to agro-
conglomerates, simultaneously leading to diminished access to
credit, inputs, and markets for subsistence farmers. 13 Since 1994,
this rural impoverishment has coincided with, if not contributed to,
growing support for rebel groups in a number of Southern states,
especially the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (Ejgrcito
Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional, Zapatistas or EZLN) in
Chiapas. That support, in turn, has lead to the orchestration of
increasing paramilitary violence on the part of peasant followers of
the PRI who vehemently oppose the Zapatista uprising.
14
A 1997 report published by the non-governmental Fray
Bartolom6 de las Casas Human Rights Center (FBCHRC) in
Chiapas describes the situation of military and paramilitary
violence:
We are living in a context of low intensity warfare.... Within
this context, a number of specific strategies are implemented by
federal and state governments in order to demobilize, to
"pacify" and contain the popular unrest created by disruptive
economic and social policies . . . [including paramilitary
violence]. 15
In 1997 alone, the FBCHRC reported on the following
incidents: violent confrontations between peasants and members
12. Dillon, supra note 7, at 4-1.
13. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 9, at 88.
14. See generally CONPAZ, ET AL., MILITARIZACION Y VIOLENCIA EN CHIAPAS
(1996).
15. FRAY BARTOLOMt DE LAS CASAS HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, WE WILL NOT
FORGET 11-12 (1997).
1999]
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of the paramilitary group "Peace and Justice" (Paz y Justicia) in
the municipality of Sabanilla; ambush of human rights observers
from a coalition of non-governmental organizations in the North
of Chiapas; numerous violent confrontations between Government
security forces and peasants; and, in the week before Christmas,
the massacre of forty-five unarmed peasants by paramilitary
groups in the municipality of Chenalh6. 16  The paramilitary
violence, linked to both state security police and the Armed Forces
occurred with virtually absolute impunity, despite its role as the
cause of a significant death toll and displacement of large
populations from their communities.
The increased paramilitary violence and the dysfunctional
criminal justice system are responsible for a significant portion of
the rising violence and crime throughout the country. Ernesto
L6pez Portillo, co-author of a 1994 study of public security issues
has argued:
In Mexico as elsewhere, crime is a career option that competes
with others.... Many Mexicans are turning to crime because
punishment is remote. The criminal justice system is chaotic; the
country has had seven attorneys general in nine years, and
turnover among lower officials is higher.]
7
In its 1998 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Mexico (1998 Report), the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR), noted that in 1995, of the 218,599 crimes
reported to the Attorney General of the Federal District, only
5,479 alleged perpetrators were brought to court. This constitutes
2.5 per cent of the total number of crimes reported; "for every one
thousand crimes, 25 were solved and 975 remained unsolved [and]
the perpetrators remained unpunished."' 18 The IACHR made
clear that the 1995 statistics were the norm during this decade and
that in 1996 "the trend was the same as in previous years."1 9
In 1997 alone, almost one and a half million crimes were
reported. 20 The Government itself observed that: "More than
150,000 arrest warrants were issued but only 85,000 were carried
16. See id. at l2.
17. Dillon, supra note 7, at 4-1.
18. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 360, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Mexico available at <http://www.oas.org/EN/PROG/ichr/countryrep/Mexico98en/Chapter-
5.htm at para. 360>.
19. Id.
20. See id at para. 366.
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out, which amount to only 6 percent of the total crimes reported.
This means that many criminals are able to evade the law and to
stay on the streets performing their deeds." 21 In its 1998 Report,
the IACHR pointed to both the evident "lack of will on the part of
the judicial authorities and their staff to apprehend those
responsible for crimes" as well as the reluctance, corruption, or
incapacity of the Public Prosecutor as an explanation for this
situation.22  Other analysts noted that police agents are the
principal organizers of crime and are often on the payroll of the
drug cartels they are ostensibly combating.
23
While police involvement in criminal violence is high, police
and security forces' involvement in human rights abuses is so
prevalent that it has become institutionalized. In a 1997 speech,
President Zedillo conceded that the police are largely responsible
for the public security crisis in Mexico:
It is profoundly indignating [sic] that judicial police agents,
instead of preventing, investigating, fighting crime and
protecting the population, are actually more cruel and
dangerous criminals because of the impunity that follows their
actions. In all honesty, ladies and gentlemen, we must admit
that when it comes to public safety, the three Powers of the
Union and the three levels of Government have failed the
citizens of our country.
24
Restructuring the training and compensation systems for
judicial police could go far toward remedying the problem.25 In
1995, a federal judicial police agent earned N$1,632.58 a month
(approximately $270); a unit chief, N$1,818.85 (approximately
$300); a section chief, N$1,948.18 (approximately $325); and a
head of group, N$2,150.90 (approximately $360).26 The IACHR
concluded that: "The lack of adequate physical resources and the
21. PRESIDENT ERNESTO ZEDILLO, AVANCES Y RETOS DE LA NACI6N, [Advances
and challenges of the Nation], PRESIDENT ERNESTO ZEDILLO'S MESSAGE AT THE
PRESENTATION OF HIS IV GOVERNMENT REPORT TO THE NATION 7 (Sept. 1, 1998),
reprinted in Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 366, supra note 18.
22. Id. at para. 364.
23. "Lucio Mendoza, a former analyst at the national security agency who now runs a
research organization, said that the authorities have not only lost control but that
members of the police are now the main organizers of crime." Dillon, supra note 7, at 4-1.
24. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 390,supra note 18.
25. Id. at para. 391.
26. In 1995, the exchange rate for the New Mexican Peso was approximately six New
Mexican Pesos to one U.S. Dollar; see id.
1999]
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low salaries result in glaring inefficiencies and create incentives for
corruption to take place in the day-to-day tasks performed by the
agents and to become the rule rather than the exception."
27
In its 1997 country report on Mexico, Amnesty International
(Amnesty) expressed concern about the autonomy of police and
security officers involved in torture:
Despite the prevalence of torture in Mexico and the hundreds
of complaints filed by victims and their relatives before the
Mexican authorities, to date Amnesty International is not
aware of any government official who has been sentenced
under the Federal Law to Prevent and Punish Torture.
28
Law enforcement agents accused of torture are occasionally
indicted and sentenced under charges such as "abuse of authority"
(abuso de autoridad). As the Amnesty report notes, these charges
carry lesser penalties and allow for release on bail. For example,
as the IACHR noted in a February 1998 report, Fernando Pav6n
Delgado was originally charged with abuse of authority in the
torture of Manuel Manriquez Agustfn and sentenced to two years
in prison. On appeal, he was released on bail and the sentence was
commuted to a fine. In total, Pav6n Delgado spent nine months
incarcerated for torturing a false confession out of a man who
spent eight years in prison for a crime he did not commit, and who
was released only because of pressure from the IACHR.
Often, the only punishment given federal police officers
accused of human rights violations is that they are transferred to
other jurisdictions. When agents are dismissed for human rights
violations, they are frequently rehired by other police forces. 29
These transfer practices have been noted by both non-
governmental and governmental human rights groups. Sam Dillon
writes in the The New York Times:
In the mid-1980's, the Government promised to compile a
single, computerized file of information on all Mexican police
officers, thus helping the authorities to avoid hiring criminals.
Three presidencies and nearly 15 years later, the list is still
27. Id. at para. 392.
28. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS
REGARDING TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN MEXICO 5, (April 30, 1997), AI Index
No. AMR 41/17/97, available at
<http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/AMR/24101797.htm> [hereinafter AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE].
29. See AMNESTY'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE, supra note 28, at 5.
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incomplete. 30
In 1996, then chief of the Mexico City police General Enrique
Salgado Cordero agreed to create such a data bank. The data
bank would list the record of every police officer employed by the
Federal District, with the purpose of dismissing and/or prosecuting
persistent offenders. Amnesty reports that the head of the Mexico
City Human Rights Commission "urged the creation of this data
bank to stop 'bad officers from entering other [police]
corporations' ("evitar que los malos elementos puedan ingresar a
otras corporaciones").3 Yet currently there are still no definitive
plans to institute such a data bank.
Torture and police abuse are not the only rampant violations
that occur in Mexico. During the Zedillo administration, there
was also a marked increase in the number of "disappearances" in
Mexico. Amnesty reports that, "In most cases, there is strong, or
even incontrovertible, evidence of official participation in carrying
out 'disappearances,' yet those responsible continue to benefit
from impunity." 32 The majority of these disappearances occurred
within the context of alleged counter-insurgency and anti-narcotics
operations, most of which take place in rural areas.
33
Victims are often members of peasant organizations,
indigenous people, students and teachers. Amnesty reports that in
many of the cases, the victims disappeared "following their
witnessed detention by members of the armed and police forces.
However, their detention is then repeatedly denied by the security
forces and the Mexican Government. '34 Sometimes, after intense
domestic and international publicity and pressure, victims
reappeared after weeks or even months, manifesting signs that
they suffered torture. In other cases, only the cadavers are found,
often bearing evidence of extra-judicial execution. Amnesty notes,
"Neither the victims nor their relatives appear to have any
effective recourse before the law in Mexico for seeking redress for
these gross human rights violations, particularly when the armed
30. Dillon, supra note 7, at 4-1.
31. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERN'S REGARDING TORTURE, supra note
28, at 5.
32. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEXICO: DISAPPEARANCES A BLACK HOLE IN
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (May 7,1998), IA Index No. AMR 41/05/98
[hereinafter DISAPPEARANCES].
33. See id.
34. Id.
1999]
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forces are involved." 35
In short, to understand the nature of the rising violence
gripping Mexico, it is critical to look beyond the headlines. First,
violent crime appears to be closely correlated with both the
economic crisis of the past few years and the Government's
responses to that crisis. Second, police are responsible for a
significant proportion of violent crime, and state-sponsored
violence committed by security forces and paramilitary groups is
rising as dramatically as individual crime in Mexico. Structural
defects in the training and compensation of police agents, coupled
with the Public Prosecutor's office and the judiciary's lack of will
to counter this illegal activity, encourages corruption and abuse,
and allows egregious human rights violations to continue
unabated.
B. Militarization of Law Enforcement and Military Abuses
On the macro-level, one of the Government's most notable
responses to increasing violence is to involve the military in
internal security matters that were previously had left to civilian
law enforcement. The military is most visible in Chiapas where
there are approximately 70,000 national troops. Its presence
however, is increasingly felt in Oaxaca and Guerrero, where the
Government believes suspected terrorist groups base their
operations. 36 The Army also assumed an ever-larger role in
Northern Mexico, where its alleged mission is to fight drug
cultivation and trafficking. Under the guise of fighting terrorism
and drugs, the military's presence in law enforcement is
"normalized" and spread to urban centers as well. For example,
35. Id. The Mexican Government often blames these human rights violations on the
creation of the governmental National Commission on Human Rights (Comisi6n Nacional
de Derechos Humanos (CNDH)). Such a commission, however, is no substitute for
effective legal remedies and has proven inadequate due to structural constraints. The
IACHR's 1998 Report notes that:
[C]ompliance with a CDNH Recommendation does not necessarily mean that
justice has been done for the victim or that the damage has been repaired. It
must also be noted that the mandate of the CNDH and that of the state human
rights commissiondoes not allow for real autonomy; that they are not competent
to analyze violations of rights of a political, labor or jurisdictional nature; and
that its recommendations are not binding.
Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 359, supra note 18.
36. See LA JORNADA, 17 de junio de 1998, cited in PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
HEALTH CARE HELD HOSTAGE:' VIOLATIONS OF MEDICAL NEUTRALITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO 2 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy) (on file with author).
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the police chiefs of many cities are now ex-military commanders,
trained in and accustomed to military, rather than civilian law
enforcement tactics.
37
The militarization of Mexico has had dire consequences for
the rule of law. In a press release issued on July 24, 1996, the
IACHR sounded its own alarm at the situation:
[B]ased on its experience, [the IACHR] wishes to draw
attention to the consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in
functions involving the security of citizens, since this could lead
to serious violations of human rights because of the military
nature and the training received by the Armed Forces.
38
The arbitrary detentions, disappearances, raids, and arrests
the Army carried out from the beginning of the military presence
in Chiapas, as well as in other states of the republic, such as
Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Veracruz, have resulted in a de
facto suspension of individual rights. Such suspension of
individual rights is simply not compatible with the rule of law.
The Armed Forces' actions are usurping civilian law
enforcement functions. For instance, the IACHR noted in its 1998
report:
During the Commission's on-site visit to Mexico, it received a
number of complaints that the Armed Forces were responsible
for arbitrary detentions, the interrogation of alleged criminals
and searches without court order. In this connection, it should
be pointed out that article 21 of the Constitution provides that
it is the exclusive responsibility of the Office of the Public
Prosecutor and the Judicial Police to prosecute crimes.
39
Rather than making public security more professional by
removing it from the purview of corrupt police agents, militarizing
public security has resulted in Army officers' increasing
involvement in human rights violations. In its 1997 Country
Report on Mexico, Amnesty stated, "The growing militarizing of
public security as well as the increase of anti-narcotics and counter
insurgency operations carried out by the Army in Mexico, has
seriously increased the number of reports of human rights
37. See, e.g., LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE TREATMENT OF
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S 1997 COUNTRY
REPORT ON MEXICO (1998).
38. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 400,supra note 18.
39. Id. at para. 406.
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violations by members of the Mexican Armed Forces." 40
Little attention is focused on the process through which this
sweeping militarizing has been legally sanctioned. The National
Public Security System Law, enacted in 1995 (Ley del Sistema de
Seguridad Pablica), created the National Public Security Council
(Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pablica (the Council)) to
coordinate actions nation-wide against threats to security. The
Council includes the Secretary of Government, Secretary of the
Army, Secretary of the Navy, Attorney General, state governors,
the Mexico City Mayor, and an Executive Secretary who is
nominated by the Council's president and elected by the Council.
The National Public Security System Law dramatically departed
from the past by explicitly providing for the intervention of the
Armed Forces in the fight against crime by converting national
security into public security. 41 For its part, the IACHR went to
great lengths to reject this conflation of ordinary crime and threats
to national sovereignty:
The [IACHR] has been informed that, under the pretext of the
increase in crime in the country and society's demand for
greater public security, the State has made a series of changes in
the law permitting the Armed Forces to intervene in areas that
are the responsibility of the civil authorities, such as public
security and the prosecution of certain crimes. This permission,
according to the same source, was granted because of a
confusion between the concepts of public security and national
security, when there is no doubt that the level of ordinary
crime, however high this may be, does not constitute a military
threat to the sovereignty of the State.42
In fact, as the body charged with ultimate authority over
police and military questions, the Council's composition
guarantees that control over public security decisions lies with the
Armed Forces.4
3
On March 11, 1996, the Mexican Supreme Court (the Court)
40. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERN'S REGARDING TORTURE, supra
note 28, at 5.
41. See Continua el Motin en el Penal de Puebla, LA JORNADA, 23 de octubre de
1995, at 10.
42. Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights in
Mexico, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Mexico (July 1996) cited in Inter-Am.
ch.5 at para. 404, supra note 18.
43. Id. at para. 405.
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considered the constitutionality of the Army's participation in
public security. Leonel Godoy and other members of the
opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la
Revoluci6n Democrdtica (PRD)) presented petitions to the Court.
In an unprecedented action, the Court ruled unanimously on the
constitutional issue in six simultaneously issued opinions (tesis).
44
In those opinions, the Court conspicuously avoided consideration
of the drafters' intent, holding that participation of the Secretaries
of the Army and Navy in the National Council on Public Security
did not violate Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court held that
the Armed Forces could participate in civil actions to promote
public security, provided that the participation meets the following
conditions: (1) they are requested to do so by civilian authorities;
(2) individual rights are not violated; and (3) such actions are
carried out in strict accordance with the Constitution and the
law.45 In practice, the requirements for military involvement in
internal public security are not monitored or enforced while the
precedent allowing it is embraced.
From a jurisprudential perspective, the Court's action was
astounding. The Court's holdings asserted that, "The Court, in its
session of March 11 of this year, approves.., the preceding
statement and determines that the vote is fit to constitute
jurisprudence[,] '' 46  making painfully explicit that the
unprecedented issuance of six simultaneous opinions was intended
to constitute jurisprudence. Such jurisprudence would be binding
on all lower courts and would definitively settle the
constitutionality question because there could be no other opinion
contradicting it. There is no other case in which the Court en banc
delivered the five requisite opinions needed to constitute
jurisprudence. 47
In Mexico the rule of law is further eroded by the impunity
with which the military commits human rights abuses and the
44. See "Rangel, Leonel Godoy," 3 S.J.F. 350 (9a 6poca 1996); "Rangel, Leonel
Godoy," 3 S.J.F. 350 (9a poca 1996); "Rangel, Leonel Godoy," 3 S.J.F. 434 (9a 6poca
1996); "Rangel, Leonel Godoy," 3 SJ.F. 435 (9a poca 1996); "Rangel, Leonel Godoy," 3
S.J.F. 436 (9a 6poca 1996); "Rangel, Leonel Godoy," 3 SJ.F. 470 (9a 6poca 1996);
"Range!, Leonel Godoy," 3 S.J.F. 471 (9a poca 1996).
45. See "Range], Leonel Godoy," 3 S.J.F. 434,435 (9a 6poca 1996).
46. "Rangel, Leonel Godoy," 3 S.J.F. 350, 351 (9a poca 1996).
47. For a discussion on how jurisprudence creates binding precedent, see infra Part
111(B).
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military's unwillingness to subject itself to the jurisdiction of civil
courts. Despite the civilian authorities' constitutional power to
assume jurisdiction over military personnel accused of common
offenses, the construction of which offenses are common crimes is
left to the discretion of military authorities. Moreover, as
Amnesty notes, that military jurisdiction has "systematically
blocked attempts by victims and their representatives to seek
punishment for those responsible for human rights violations."
48
The Gallardo case, in which an officer accused the Mexican
military of human rights abuses, illustrates the military's lack of
legal accountability to civilian authorities, even in cases where
international pressure is brought to bear. The IACHR, which
heard evidence in the Gallardo case in 1996, issued its finding in
1997, calling for Gallardo's immediate release and for his
indemnification for damages resulting from his imprisonment. The
Government was unable or unwilling to confront the military
regarding the allegations and, as a result, failed to comply with the
findings of the IACHR.
49
Another case brought before the IACHR involved the
execution of three men in Morelia, Chiapas in the wake of the
EZLN uprising.50 After all domestic remedies were exhausted,
Mexican human rights groups, in conjunction with the Center for
Justice and International Law presented the Morelia case to the
IACHR on November 23, 1994.51 The petitioners accused the
Army of violating fundamental civil liberties and depriving the
victims of judicial guarantees and protection under, inter alia,
Articles 1, 4, 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR). 52  Despite the Army's attempts to deny
responsibility, the IACHR, after a lengthy investigation, found for
the petitioners and recommended that the Government
compensate the widows of the three victims and pursue criminal
investigations against the suspected Army officers. 53 In March
48. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERN'S REGARDING TORTURE, supra note
28, at 5.
49. See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS "MIGUEL AGUSTIN PRO JUAREZ,"
SERVICIO DIARIO DE INFORMACI6N SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS SOBRE MtXICO
(June 10, 1998) sec. V at 5-6.
50. See Case No. 11.411, Inter-Am C.H.R. 45, OEAIser/L./V./II.96, doc. 95 rev. 7
(1996).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. In 1996, Mexican Government officials informally spoke to the families of the
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1998, after the Government continued to stall implementation of
the recommendations, the IACHR announced that it was
publishing its findings on the case to the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States.
In sum, behind the alarming crime statistics in Mexico are
deeply-rooted structural and institutional sources of violence.
Mexico has become a nation where those charged with law
enforcement are themselves perpetrators of criminal activity. The
"Miguel Agustfn Pro Judrez" Human Rights Center notes:
[A]lthough the Executive Branch alludes to diverse social
causes for the phenomenon of crime, such as 'unemployment or
under employment derived from the economic crisis period and
austerity [measures], population growth, corruption among
public security forces, impunity for criminals, its proposal
attempts to reduce crime levels through only raising penalties
and forgets the rest.'
54
The Government's own role in engendering human rights
abuses is entirely disregarded. In particular, its conversion of
public security into national security and concomitant militarizing
of law enforcement only served to increase human rights abuses
and further erode the rule of law. The IACHR, in its 1998 Report,
urged the Government to revisit the Supreme Court decisions of
March, 1996, and to reform the Law on the National System of
Public Security "with a view to restricting the National Armed
Forces to the role for which they were created, namely, the
security and defense of the Federation against outside
attack.... ,,55 In particular, Article 27 of the ACHR, to which
Mexico is a party, calls for such a restriction of the role of the
Armed Forces.56
men to discuss a solution to the dispute, but the families insisted on a full investigation and
proper punishment of those responsible. The CNDH has been investigating the case from
the beginning, but three years later has still not released a report and is reluctant to
pressure the Mexican Army. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, IMPLAUSIBLE
DENIABILITY STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RURAL VIOLENCE IN MEXICO (1997).
54. LEGALIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD, supra note 4, at 5.
55. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch.5, at para. 421, supra note 18.
56. Case No. 11.411, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, OEA/serL./V./II.96, doc. 95 rev. 7, at
para. 27(1996).
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE AMPARO 57
MECHANISM
The right to a fair trial under Mexican law is protected
through a series of "personal rights" enumerated in Articles 13, 14,
16, 17, 19 and 20 of the Constitution. This section provides an
overview of the judicial process, notes where practice deviates
from the provisions enshrined in the Constitution and discusses the
role of the two types of amparo mechanisms, direct and indirect,
used to safeguard individuals' rights within the judicial system.
The Mexican civil code system differs from the common law
system in the United States. Similarly, trial in Mexico differs from
its common law equivalent. In Mexico the judicial process entails
a series of fact-finding sessions and hearings over time, which are
supplemented by documentary evidence. Judges play a more
prominent role in the civil system, actively engaging in fact-finding
and questioning witnesses rather than simply mediating the law.
Moreover, in Mexico, as in most civil code systems judicial review
is limited.
Indeed, the principal means of redressing violations of a
defendant's constitutional rights in the judicial process is through
the amparo, or protection suit, mechanism. As discussed below,
the amparo greatly expands upon the United States' Writ of
habeas corpus and allows defendants to appeal rulings regarding
the admission of evidence, the validity of an arrest and other due
process concerns.
A. Overview of the Judicial Process
A Mexican "trial" is really a judicial process with three
distinct stages. In the first stage, the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio
Ptiblico) conducts an extensive pre-trial preliminary investigation
(averiguaci6n previa).58 The role of the Public Prosecutor is to
determine whether, after interrogating the witnesses, the evidence
is sufficient to warrant formal charges, gathering the other
evidence, and questioning the suspect. Under Mexican law, the
accused has the right to be represented by counsel during the
57. "Amparo" means protection, from the verb 'amparar,' to protect or defend. THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 55 (4th ed. 1987).
58. Obviously, this stage in obviated in cases where the suspect is arrested in the act
of committing the crime.
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preliminary investigation and the right to remain silent.59 If the
Public Prosecutor determines that the equivalent of reasonable
cause exists, the Public Prosecutor sends the record assembled
during the initial investigation to the criminal court.
A defendant's rights can be exercised pro se or through a
lawyer. When a defendant cannot afford an attorney, one is
appointed for him from a pool of public defenders (defensores
pablicos) who often lack independence and are severely
overworked. Although the right to counsel theoretically attaches
immediately in the pre-trial investigation phase, the early
participation of public defenders does little to ameliorate abuse.
Indigenous people fare even worse than other similarly
impoverished defendants. Although the law calls for interpreters
for non-Spanish speaking indigenous defendants, Amnesty reports
that "these are rarely available and most indigenous people facing
trial in Mexico continue to suffer the lack of this basic right."
60
After the accused submits a formal statement to the judge,
(declaraci6n preparatoria), the second phase, called "Instructions"
(Instrucciones), begins. In this phase, the Public Prosecutor and
the defense attorney conduct a series of discrete hearings before
the judge and gather evidence from witnesses, including the
accused. In addition to oral testimony, documentary evidence may
be offered from private parties as well as public sources and
records. Notarized documentary evidence need not be submitted
to a separate evidentiary authentication process, as is the case in
the United States. As in other civil code countries, a defendant in
Mexico theoretically has an unlimited right to discovery of all the
evidence assembled by the prosecution. This, however, is rarely
observed in practice.
The Constitution also provides for the right of the accused to
-attend the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony
presented, but these rights are also seldom upheld in practice.
Two 1998 cases involving indigenous persons who, accused of
involvement in establishing autonomous Zapatista communities,
were detained without bail in Tuxtla Guti6rrez, Chiapas, are
illustrative. There, the presiding judge stated that "there was no
59. For a discussion on the practical reality of the abrogation of these rights, see infra
Part V.B.
60. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE, supra note 28,
1999] 483
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
reason for the accused to be present at the hearings" where the
arresting police were going to testify.61 Routinely, transcripts of
witness testimony are substituted for the defendant's presence at
the hearing, essentially nullifying the defendant's right of cross-
examination. The lack of cross examination arises as a result of
the defendants' difficulty obtaining transcripts for defendants; thus
effective cross examination becomes difficult if not impossible.
Yet, international treaties to which Mexico is bound specify
that the accused should always have the opportunity to cross-
examine adverse witnesses and call their own witnesses according
to the same terms as the prosecution. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), states that, "everyone shall
be entitled... [to] examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him." 62
Also in this second stage of the Mexican trial, the judge
actively questions both the witnesses and the defendant. The
judge becomes an active arbiter between the prosecutor and
defense counsel. In addition, the Public Prosecutor's role is
theoretically less partisan than in the common law adversarial
system. 63 The Government bears the burden of proof and the
Public Prosecutor must consider all exculpatory evidence in both
the preliminary investigation and during the trial.
In the third and final stage of the Mexican trial, often called
"Conclusions" (conclusiones), the judge reaches conclusions based
on written recommendations from the defense attorney and Public
Prosecutor and formulates a sentence. Article 20 of the Mexican
Constitution states that the criminal trial process, from arrest to
ultimate disposition of the case, should last no more than four
months if the charge carries a penalty of less than two years of
imprisonment, and no more than twelve months if the penalty
exceeds two years (except where defense counsel seeks more time
61. Statements made by presiding judge, at hearings on October 9, 1998 Juez Tercero
de lo Penal, Tuxtla Gutidrrez, Chiapas. Author, Pilar Noriega, was present during these
statements and, as defense counsel, insisted on the defendants' presence (transcripts on
file with author).
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,.at art. 14(3)(e), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
63. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 95 (1994).
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to prepare the case). In practice, however, few judicial processes
are completed within this timeframe. Records from Mexico's
National Human Rights Commission indicate that "the average
time taken for an accused person to be sentenced in a court of first
instance is one year and 10 months."64 Delays are principally due
to backlogs and the difficulty in scheduling police agent and
government forensic expert appearances at trial.
In sum, the three-stage Mexican trial process parallels that of
the trial process in the United States. Mexico maintains a dual
state and federal court system where the court of last resort is the
federal Supreme Court. In addition, Mexican federal courts have
jurisdiction over disputes concerning official acts that allegedly
violate individual rights (amparo cases), acts by the federal
government that infringe upon states' rights, acts that infringe on
the jurisdiction of the Federal District (Mexico City), and acts by
state governments or the Federal District that infringe upon the
jurisdiction of the federal government. 65 Lower criminal court
decisions can be appealed to intermediate appellate courts and, in
certain instances, to the Supreme Court. Lower state court
decisions can be appealed to the highest state court and, in certain
instances, to the Supreme Court. Although these parallels to the
United States trial process exist, there is an additional process
distinct to Mexico. In Mexico, claims based on abuses of
constitutional rights almost always turn on a second kind of appeal
available exclusively at the federal level, the "amparo"
mechanism.
B. The Amparo Mechanism
The amparo, or "protection suit," originated in 19th Century
Mexico, but is now used by many Latin American countries. In
Mexico today, the juicio de amparo provides a cause of action
where in a plaintiff can challenge the constitutionality of actions by
a government authority or provisions of a given law. 66 Amparo
combines elements of the Anglo-American writs of habeus corpus,
mandamus, error and injunction. 67 Amparos may be exercised by
64. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch.5 at para. 397, supra note 18.
65. CONST. art. 103 (Mex.).
66. In other countries, the amparo is limited to a habeus corpus function. See
HECTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO, LA PROTECCION JURIDICA Y PROCESAL DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS ANTE LAS JURISDICCIONES NACIONALES 121-36 (1982).
67. RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE
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individuals who previously suffered harm as well as by those in
fear of imminent harm by governmental officials resulting from
violations of the personal rights set out in the first 29 articles of the
Constitution, the equivalent of the U.S. Bill of Rights.68 The
Amparo can also be invoked in Constitutional disputes over
federal and state jurisdiction.69
In Mexico, the amparo is used as a broad procedural device
that permits individuals to protect their constitutional and human
rights not only in criminal cases, but also in civil, administrative or
labor disputes, and at both the state and federal level.70 In
practice, the amparo is often the last resort for safeguarding a
criminal defendants' rights. This practice, however, is troubling
since it results from other theoretically available safeguards-such
as the ordinary appeals process-not being respected. Thus, the
recent reforms in the Law of Amparo, which limit defendants'
recourse, require examination.
Some jurists and commentators delineate five functions of the
amparo mechanism but, in practice, it is best to distinguish
between two types of amparos: direct and indirect.71 The direct
amparo is used within the judicial process itself against final
judgments by courts of law and administrative or labor tribunals.
In criminal trials, the amparo proceeding is a type of special appeal
made directly to the federal Collegial Circuit Courts (Tribunales
de Colegiado).72 When granted, the direct amparo modifies or
revokes the sentence issued by the trial judge.
The indirect amparo protects against official actions that
AMPARO SUIT at xiii (1971).
68. In practice, amparos are generally sought for violations of Articles 14 or 16 of the
Constitution. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. lb at para. 93, supra note 18.
69. Ignacio Burgoa Orihuela, a Mexican constitutional scholar, has called the amparo
a constitutional oversight mechanism. See IGNACIO BURGOA ORIHUELA, EL JUICIO DE
AMPARO (1986) in Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch.5 at para. 404, supra note 18.
70. See generally HtCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO, JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL,
OMBUDSMAN Y DERECHOS HUMANOS (1993); HtCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO, ESTUDIOS
SOBRE EL DERECHO DE AMPARO (1993).
71. See FIX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 66, at 121-136. Fix-Zamudio enumerates the
personal liberty amparo; the cassation amparo, the amparo against laws, the administrative
amparo, and the agrarian amparo. See also BAKER, supra note 67, at 175-6 (discussing the
amparo).
72. In criminal cases, the amparo can substitute for an appeal, whereas in civil,
administrative, commercial cases, all appeals must be exhausted before an amparo is filed.
See Michael Taylor, Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of
Mexico's Judicial Branch, 27 N.M. L. REV. 141,151-52 (1997).
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violate constitutional guarantees outside of the judicial process.
For example, as expulsion of foreigners increased in the southern
state of Chiapas in 1998, a number of foreign nationals invoked
amparos against the future threat of detention and expulsion from
the country. 73 Indirect amparos may also be used to challenge the
application of unconstitutional laws. "The individual challenges a
law, not to have it struck from the books, but rather to gain a
personal exception from it for particular reasons to be
presented. '74  If the plaintiff wins, he receives a personal
exemption from the application of the law, but the law itself
remains in force. Finally, the indirect amparo can also be utilized
in cases where third parties allege violation of their rights during a
judicial process.
In contrast to direct amparos, indirect amparos are heard by
the Federal District Courts (Tribunales de Distrito).75 The amparo
proceeding is brought directly before the Supreme Court when the
dispute involves a constitutional controversy between the federal
government and municipalities, the Federal District, or the states,
in the event of a dispute between any two of the three branches of
government within a state or at the federal level. The amparo is
also used in the case of "actions of unconstitutionality" (acciones
de inconstitucionalidad).76
One U.S. critic of the amparo mechanism, Michael Taylor,
argues that "the segregation of all constitutional issues into
amparo suits lowers the 'constitutional consciousness' of a
significant portion of the judiciary. Taylor further asserts, "The
majority of magistrates and judges are never given the opportunity
to develop a facility for defending, defining, and interpreting
constitutional principles." 77  That is, if a Mexican criminal
defendant chooses to make a constitutional claim about an illegal
detention or search and seizure, he must file a separate amparo
suit, which is not considered a part of the original case, in the form
of a suppression hearing. In the United States, all of this would
normally be heard as one case. Taylor suggests that the vast
majority of magistrates and judges never hear or rule upon
constitutional issues because constitutional arguments must be
73. See generally LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29.
74. Taylor, supra note 72, at 152.
75. Note the discussion in Taylor ignores this fact; see id.
76. For a discussion on the "actions of unconstitutionality" see infra Part IV.C.
77. Taylor, supra note 72, at 154.
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heard in special federal courts, and that this is detrimental to the
defendants. Practitioners in Mexico, however, feel strongly that
given the degree of corruption and ineffective due process in state
courts, the defense of individuals' rights would suffer greatly if
state trial court judges (jueces comunes), who are renowned for
their corruption and ineptitude, determined amparo proceedings.
78
Such a separation of constitutional issues from ordinary trial
proceedings exists in other civil law jurisdictions as well. For
example, in Germany, when a defendant raises a constitutional
objection to a statute involved in any civil, criminal, or
administrative case, the case will be referred to a special
Constitutional Court. The court will decide on specific
constitutional issues and remand the case so that the original
proceeding can resume.
79
Taylor next argues that in accordance with the "Otero
formulation" of the amparo in Mexico, amparo rulings have no
binding precedential value on future cases. An amparo issued in a
case of a police coerced confession may have no precedential
effect on a case where another defendant's confession was
extracted under precisely the same circumstances. Similarly, a
finding that a law is unconstitutional benefits solely the individual
plaintiff.80 Taylor further claims that this "system allows an
unconstitutional law to be validly applied to all other citizens...
[and] only those citizens attuned to the minutiae of the legal
system and who have the economic resources to hire a lawyer will
be exempted."
'81
Although Taylor is correct in pointing out that in other civil
law countries, similarly situated plaintiffs can jointly bring suit
using some form of amparo mechanism, it is misleading to
overemphasize the lack of stare decisis in Mexico with respect to
amparos.82 As the IACHR notes:
[T]he effects of the so-called "Otero formula" pertaining to the
relative nature of the amparo sentences are attenuated by the
power given to the criteria of the Supreme Court and the
78. In some ways, Mexican attorneys' feelings in this regard mirror the justifications
for the use of federal civil rights statutes in the United States. See Taylor, supra note 72, at
164-65.
79. See GLENDON, supra note 63, at 59.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
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Appellate Courts . . . under which such criteria become
jurisprudence of an obligatory nature for the rest of the courts
of Mexico. This means that if in a concrete case the Supreme
Court were to determine that a legal norm is unconstitutional,
those affected by that decision may invoke in their favor the
criterion set forth by that Court in the respective amparo
decision .... 83
In Mexico, according to the Constitution, the Supreme Court
and Collegial Circuit Courts are authorized to give rulings of
"jurisprudence," which are binding precedents. The resolutions of
the Supreme Court and the Collegial Circuit Courts constitute
jurisprudence when the decisions are sustained in five opinions
and not overruled. 84 According to the Law of Amparo, a Supreme
Court decision is binding on all courts in the country. The
difference between the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and
that of its panels is that Supreme Court jurisprudence is binding on
the panels, but the panels jurisprudence is not binding on the Court
en banc. The jurisprudence of the Collegial Circuit Courts is
binding on all courts except the Supreme Court.
Thus, the problem with the amparo mechanism lies not so
much in the legal device itself but in the fact that the federal judges
who preside over amparo proceedings replicate the same
corruption and lack of respect for human rights that infects the rest
of the judicial system. The overwhelming majority of amparo suits
are thrown out of the federal courts. Taylor reports: "The Centro
de Investigaci6n para el Desarrollo (Center of Investigation for
Development (CIDAC)) reports that while 11% of plaintiffs were
successful in their amparo suit in 1992, and 12% were unsuccessful,
a full 77% of all amparo suits filed resulted in a denial of
proceedings. Improper procedure is the most common reason
given by the Supreme Court for a denial. '85 Judges and Public
Prosecutors argue that defense attorneys abuse the amparo
procedure to obtain reduced sentences for their clients. Indeed,
sentence reduction is one of the purposes of the mechanism.
However, attorneys would not need to resort to amparos so
83. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. lb, para. 100, supra note 18.
84. See id. The opinions of the Mexican Supreme Court must be approved by eight of
the eleven justices while, in order to constitute jurisprudence, the opinions of the Collegial
Circuit Courts must be unanimous. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF AMPARO LAW 41 (Vera
Murray-Campbell trans., 1969) (discussing art. 192).
85. Id.
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frequently if trial and appellate judges ensured defendants their
due process rights, including rights of appeals in the first instance.
In theory, the Mexican judicial process provides the
defendant with virtually all of the same protections that a
defendant would receive in the United States. In practice,
however, the government routinely deprives the accused of even
the most basic rights of due process, such as non-incrimination and
cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the amparo
mechanism increasingly becomes the only recourse against
rampant abuses by the Government. While potentially an
effective mechanism for the protection of individuals' rights within
the judicial process, the amparo proves susceptible to the same
problems of judicial apathy and corruption plaguing the rest of the
judicial structure.
IV. THE JUDICIARY AND RECENT JUDICIAL REFORMS
In Mexico, the judiciary has historically been in the shadow of
the executive. It is also deeply involved in the abuse of human
rights. In particular, torture has become an institutionalized
method of extracting confessions from suspects. This is largely due
to the acceptance of forced confessions. Moreover, while attention
focuses on the inept and corrupt police, the role of judges in the
perpetuation of torture has remained relatively unexamined. In
this section, this article first examines how part of the gap between
law and practice is attributable to the structural inadequacies of
the judicial branch, which is hampered by corruption and cronyism
in the ruling PRI. Specifically, this article considers the role of
judges in the institutionalization of torture. Finally, this article
describes the Zedillo Administration's judicial reforms and
discusses the cosmetic nature of the reforms, as they ignore both
human rights concerns and fundamental challenges to creating an
independent judiciary in Mexico.
A. Overview of the Judiciary
In its report on the World Bank sponsored reform of the
Venezuelan judiciary, Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and
the Venezuelan Justice System, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights (the Lawyers Committee) notes:
Almost all Latin American constitutions have established
republican states based on the historical tripartite division of
power among the executive, legislature, and judiciary.
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Historically, however, the three branches have never been
coequal (and were never intended to be). The Latin American
executive has extensive formal power, deriving from the
presidential rule roles of chief executive, commander-in-chief
and head of state.8
6
In the case of Mexico, the judiciary's subservience to the
executive branch is exacerbated by the one-party state. The ruling
PRI has historically used the judiciary to house party loyalists who
have not received, or are waiting for more plum political
appointments. 87  Just as the PRI-dominated legislature
traditionally rubber-stamped legislation proposed by the
President, the judiciary lacks anything more than the most nominal
independence.
As the state began to pursue the neo-liberal economic policies
of the 1980's and 1990's, it began to privatize assets. The state and
the ruling PRI lost some of the social control and conflict
resolution techniques that they relied upon in the past. As
electoral reforms began taking effect, and opposition parties
gained important positions during the last ten years, co-optation
and social marginalization became somewhat more limited as
means of securing voter and party loyalty. In its briefing paper,
The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements
of Reform, the World Bank notes this general trend in Latin
America:
As the Latin American and Caribbean Region continues the
process of economic development, greater importance is being
given to judicial reform . A well-functioning judiciary is
important for economic development. The purpose of any
judiciary of any society is to order social relationships and
resolve conflicts among those societal actors.
88
Therefore, it was predictable that in Mexico, where the
Salinas and Zedillo administrations have vigorously pursued
models of economic development sponsored by the World Bank
86. THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & THE VENEZUELAN
PROGRAM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ACTION, HALFWAY TO REFORM:
THE WORLD BANK AND THE VENEZUELAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 17 (1996) [hereinafter
HALFWAY TO REFORM].
87. For example, an article recently described the Mexican Supreme Court as "a
holding pen for presidential cronies." Sam Dillon, Crime is Unleashed, But the D.A. Is
Undaunted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998, at A4.
88. DAKOLIAS, supra note 2, at xi.
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and United States, that the courts would to assume a greater role
in resolving disputes between individuals and conflicts between
individuals and the state.
The Lawyers Committee argues that foreign investors, in
particular, are concerned that "fundamental civil and political
rights, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
the right to fair pretrial and trial procedures, the right to be free of
any unconstitutional actions taken by the government, cannot be
vindicated by a deeply politicized and corrupt judiciary."89 As
part of its economic development programs, the World Bank
stressed the need for raising public confidence in the deeply
discredited judiciaries of Latin America.90 Yet, the Mexican
judiciary is saddled with the legacy of decades of politicization and
neglect, which are not so easily undone. In a 1995 interview,
Juventino Castro, former Legal Coordinator of the federal
Attorney General's Office and current President of the First Panel
of the Supreme Court, argued that the principal problem with the
judiciary in Mexico is a lack of public confidence. Castro stated
that the Executive and Legislative Branches treat the judiciary
paternalistically, directing its actions, regulating it, and deciding its
structure.91 In Human Rights and Judicial Power in Mexico, the
Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights argues that the judiciary's
lack of independence manifests itself in both objective, e.g.
political appointments and subjective, e.g. patterns of serving the
Government's interests. 92
In Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of
Judiciary, Owen Fiss distinguishes among the three different types
of judicial independence that incorporate both the objective and
subjective elements discussed by Minnesota Advocates for Human
Rights. The three elements are: (1) party detachment or
89. Id.
90. For example, "in Argentina only 13 percent of the public have confidence in the
administration of justice. In Brazil, 74 percent of the public view the administration of
justice as fair or poor. The worst case perhaps exists in Peru, where 92 percent of the
population lack confidence in the judges." DAKOLIAS, supra note 2, at 4 (footnotes and
citations omitted).
91. See David Aponte & Jesds Aranda, Tratan como Menor de edad al Poder Judicial,
LA JORNADA, 2 de junio de 1995, available at,
http://serpiente.dsgca.unam.mx/jordana/1995/un95 /950602/ministro.html> (interview with
Juventino Castro).
92. See MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MEXICO PROJECT,
DERECHOS HUMANOS Y PODER JUDICIAL EN MtXICO (1995).
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independence from the interests of political parties; (2) individual
autonomy or independence from the bureaucratic judicial
structure and other judges; and (3) political insularity or
independence from other governmental institutions."93 In Mexico,
none of these elements exist as the symbiotic PRI and
Government overwhelmed any autonomy that judges might hope
to exercise. Politicized court appointments and the exertion of
political influence over cases, coupled with egregious corruption
among judges who have gone out of their way to serve the state's
interests, have entirely undermined the prestige and respectability
of the judiciary as an institution.
A successful judicial career in Mexico often covers a series of
progressively higher court appointments which have traditionally
been made on the basis party loyalty and patronage, rather than
merit. Even with its rather narrow view of judicial reform, the
World Bank decried this kind of subjection of judicial
appointments to political interests:
Judicial appointments that are based on standards to ensure
political loyalty only perpetuate the dependence of the
judiciary. It is essential, therefore, that only those individuals
truly qualified be considered for judicial positions.... In
addition to the judicial appointment system, the judicial term
also plays an important role in ensuring the independence of
the judiciary. Judicial terms should be set to allow for as much
independence as possible.94
In Mexico, circuit and district court judges serve six-year
terms. These terms coincide with the duration of the Presidential
term. At the end of six years, they are renewed in their posts or
promoted to higher office. Theoretically, every six years, these
93. Owen Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF JUDICIARY 55-56 (1993). Theodore Becker has
defined independence as follows:
(a) [T]he degree to which judges believe they can decide and do decide
consistent with their own personal attitudes, values and conceptions of the
judicial role (in their interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others,
who have or are believed to have political or judicial power, think about or
desire in like matters, and (c) particularly when a decision adverse to the belief
or desires of those with political or judicial power may bring some retribution on
the judges personally or on the power of the court.
DAKOLIAS, supra note 2, at 7 n.29 (citation omitted).
94. In 1993, about 50 percent of the superior court judges in Peru were provisional
judges without tenure, and were therefore unwilling to take action that might risk their
jobs. DAKOLIAS, supra note 2, at 11-13.
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judges may be removed from office only under enumerated
circumstances and in accordance with the procedures established
by law.9
5
However, judges are often removed or forced out to make
way for other political appointments when the administration
changes. The IACHR confirms this view in its 1998 report:
Numerous complaints about corruption, lack of independence
and impartiality have made the judicial branch in Mexico one of
the organs that enjoys the least public prestige. This mistrust is
most pronounced with respect to the judicial branch at the state
level, because of the influence which some individuals or groups
exercise over the bodies responsible for the appointment of
judges.9
6
State judges shall hold office for the term established
pursuant to the state constitutions. State judges are often chosen
by panels and may be re-appointed at the end of their terms. In
theory, they can only be removed from office only in accordance
with statutory provisions governing the accountability of state
employees. 9
7
In Mexico, only the justices of the Supreme Court cannot be
removed from office. The IACHR notes the impact of this
situation on what, in Fiss' terminology, would be a prerequisite for
"political insularity," which is a necessity for achieving true judicial
independence:
The fact that circuit magistrates and district judges are subject
to transfer until appointed to a new position undermines the
principle of genuine unremovability, which is an essential
requirement for an independent judicial branch. Moreover, the
fact that lower court judges are not unremovable at all, together
with the absence of anything that could be called a genuine
legal career, gives cause for real concern. 98
In its 1998 Report, the IACHR went on to point out that the
Supreme Court lacks independence: the "[Mexican] system for
the political appointment of judges of the Supreme Court of
Mexico is the control which one political party has had for more
than 60 years over both the executive and the legislative
95. CONST. art. 97. (Mex.).
96. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5 para. 394, supra note 18.
97. CONST.art. 116 § III (Mex.).
98. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 395, supra note 18.
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branches." 99
In addition to the structural aspects of judicial independence,
such as judicial appointments, terms and removal, the World Bank
has emphasized that the concept also contains organizational and
administrative elements:
[W]hich must be considered during reform... in order to
change the public's perception of corrupt behavior in the
judiciary.... The administrative aspects of independence
include court and case administration. Court administration
involves the administrative functions of the courts, including
administrative offices, personnel, budget, information systems,
statistics, planning and court facilities.
1 0°
These administrative aspects are in serious need of reform in
Mexico. The Byzantine bureaucracy of the Mexican court system
not only creates long delays, but also creates opportunities for
corruption in order to "speed up" a person's trial. Court fees are
often very high, especially when bribes for having processing done
in a timely manner are included, making it difficult or impossible
for poor defendants to acquire their case file of the charges filed
against them. In truly Kafkaesque form, the defendant may be
unaware of the full nature of the charges pending against him or
the source of the accusation by the state. 101
B. The Role of the Judiciary in the Perpetuation of Torture
The most extreme manifestation of political corruption is the
judiciary's role in the perpetuation of torture as a method of
extracting confessions and solving cases. Although many
99. Id. at ch.1, para. 41.
100. DAKOLIAS, supra note 2, at xii-xiii.
101. The IACHR Report states:
Mr. Jorge Luis Rodrfguez Losa, President of the High Court of Justice of the
State of Yucatdn, in October 1992, acknowledged the existence of corruption in
the jurisdictional organ of the state and added that a case may be dragged out
for 7 or 8 years. In November 1992, Mr. Evaristo Morales Huerta, President of
the National Federation of Colleges of Lawyers, noted the need to restore the
prestige of the Supreme Court of Justice and drew attention to the fact that its
decisions are more political than legal, since members were appointed from the
political arena, a trend which must be stopped. This position is consistent with
the complaint lodged by members of the High Court of Justice of the Federal
District, who also claimed that innocent persons were sentenced to avoid the
suspicion of corruption.
Criminal Proceedings Review No. 854, March 1993 cited in Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para.
395, n.7, supra note 18.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
commentators attribute the prevalence of torture in Mexico to
police agents,10 2 the judiciary has been just as guilty of such
offenses. It is, after all, judges who determine whether there are
indications of torture and the validity of evidence obtained
illegally. It is judges who provide the necessary oversight so that
the defendant receives an appropriate defense and has every
opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. In short, it is judges
who ought to be, but in practice are not, the gatekeepers of the
defendant's most fundamental rights.
A panoply of international instruments speak to the
inadmissibility of statements gathered under torture. The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment (CAT), obligates Mexico, as a signatory
nation, to "ensure that any statement which is established to have
been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence
in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as
evidence that the statement was made." 10 3 The ICCPR, to which
Mexico is also a party, prohibits torture, and cruel or inhuman
treatment. 104 The Constitution also prohibits the use of torture,
and all states, except Puebla and Hidalgo, have laws on their books
forbidding torture. 105
In 1993, an amendment to Article 20 of the Constitution was
passed prohibiting the use of opinions given to police by detainees
as evidence in criminal trials. Pursuant to that reform, opinions
can only be used as evidence when made to Public Prosecutors or
in front of a judge. 10 6 Two years earlier, Congress passed the
Federal Law to Prevent and Punish Torture (Ley para Prevenir y
Sancionar la Tortura), which prohibits and penalizes use of torture
and states that, "no confession or information obtained through
102. See, e.g., Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 8(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7 (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur].
103. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
104. See CONST. art. 20 (11) (Mex.); G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 62, at art. 2.
105. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE, supra note
28.
106. See CONST. art. 20 (11) (Mex.).
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torture can be used as evidence." 107 It further mandates that the
detainee's lawyer or a person of confidence has to be present
during any period an official opinion of confession is given.
Despite Mexico's constitutional provisions, this legislation,
and its obligations under international law, torture continues to be
practiced systematically and with impunity. Indeed, a 1997 report
by the Human Rights NGO Network, "All Rights for Everyone"
(Red de Organismos Civiles de los Derechos Humanos "Todos los
Derechos para Todos"), stated that levels of torture in the country
were at their highest levels in decades. 10 8 Nigel Rodley, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on torture, also concluded from his 1997 visit
that the use of torture in Mexico appears to be endemic.
10 9
Torture increased 600% in Mexico between 1996 and 1997.110
This is an alarming finding, especially given the prevalence of
torture already recorded in the country.
111
Article 11 of the Federal Law to Prevent and Punish Torture
obligates all public servants who are aware of a case of torture to
report it immediately. However, this is not practiced by Public
Prosecutors, judges, or public defenders. Not only is this law not
followed, but judges consistently rule that a certification of lesions
on the detainee is not sufficient evidence that the lesions were
caused by the officer. 112 Despite the existence of the Federal Law
to Prevent and Punish Torture, as well as amendments to the
Constitution that explicitly prohibit torture and the use of opinions
exacted with the use of torture, judges continue to consider that
the first statement or "confession" was made without coaching and
therefore ought not to be retracted.
113
In Mexico, the confession has historically been treated by
judges as one of the most valuable types of evidence. Judicial
opinions are rife with statements regarding a defendant's
declarations about torture and mistreatment at the hands of the
107. LEY PARA PREVENIR Y SANCIONAR LA TORTURA, art. 8 (1991) (Mex.).
108. See RED DE DERECHOS HUMANOS TODOS LOS DERECHOS PARA TODOS, LA
CNDH: IMPUNIDAD Y TORTURA 3 (1998).
109. See generally 1997 Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note
102, at 25.
110. See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS "MIGUEL AGUSTiN PRO JUAREZ,"
SERVICIO DIARIO DE INFORMACI6N SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN MtXICO § IV
(June 17, 1998).
111. See id.
112. LEY PARA REVENIR Y SANCIONAR LA TORTURA, art. 11 (1991) (Mex.).
113. CONST. art. 20 (Mex.).
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police. If these statements are contrary to a declaration by the
arresting judicial agents, or are contrary to a report finding no
injury opinions issued by the medical examiners from the Public
Prosecutor's office, the suspect's statements are given no legal
value. Due to precedent, many judges are suspicious of
confessions that are retracted only after the defendant has
received protective instructions from defense counsel.
Notwithstanding significant evidence indicating that involuntary
confessions are unreliable, judges in Mexico to view confessions to
have the most probative value.
114
Due process not only necessitates that defendants' statements
are made voluntarily, to ensure reliability, but it also acts as a
check on the judiciary in other areas. For example, it is well
established in the United States that the exclusionary rule deters
police misconduct. 115 Further, more recent opinions by the U.S.
Supreme Court articulate an inherent value in avoiding judicial
sanction of unconstitutional practices. 116 In Mapp v. Ohio, the
Court stressed the importance of judicial integrity for the sake of
maintaining public confidence in the judiciary as an institution.117
The integrity of the judiciary in Mexico, however, has
historically been of little weight in the official discourse
surrounding forced confessions in Mexico. To this day, judges in
Mexico go out of their way to dismiss the statements of the
accused by forcing him or her to bear the burden of proof as to the
lack of veracity of the police. A typical court record reads as
follows:
One must point out that there does not exist the evidence on
records of a sufficiently strong motive that the Judicial [Police]
114. See generally 22 SJ.F. "Martinez, Sebastian Garrido," 36 (6a 6poca). "Para que la
retractaci6n de la confesi6n anterior del inculpado tenga eficacia legal, precisa estarfundada
en datos y pruebas aptas y bastantes para justificarlo juridicamente." Id. See Documents
Related to the Request for the Extradition of Mr. Geovanni Gomez Esprin [Criminal
Case No. 93/1985], Presented by the Government of Mexico to the Government of the
United States of America, (Procuraduria de la Republica, Resolution dated Aug 4, 1986)
[hereinafter Gomez Esprin Case].
115. As early as the 1940's, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the exclusionary
rule for confessions was similar to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and
was meant to deter abuse on the part of investigating police agents. See, e.g. Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 143 (1944); Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596, 596 (1948).
116. In Elkins v. United States, the Supreme Court admonished judges who assisted "in
the willful disobedience of a Constitution that they are sworn to uphold." Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
117. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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Agents, of their own will, pointed out the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime.... [Therefore] given the theory of
the procedural proximity of the evidence, the initial
declarations of the accused receive priority since the
corresponding legal value had been given to them because they
were issued with proximity to the facts, which does not apply to
his retraction.
118
Thus, even if the defendant consistently claims his confession
was extracted under torture, he bears the burden of proof as to the
motive on the part of the police for detaining him and forcing a
confession.119  Such a policy directly conflicts with the
internationally recognized human right to be presumed
innocent.120 In Mexico, where there is a widespread practice of
arbitrary arrests based on subsequently fabricated charges, the use
of forced confessions is especially troubling.
121
It is this judicial policy of placing greater weight on the first
statements given by detainees rather than on later statements that
is the most fundamental obstacle to the eradication of torture in
Mexico; as Amnesty's 1997 report states:
[Amnesty International] believes that the practice of torture in
Mexico is not only caused by corruption and lack of resources
in the initial stages of criminal investigations, but by a judicial
system which gives confessions, regardless of the circumstances
in which they are obtained, full weight as evidence. According
to Mexican law, when the defendant does not support with
other evidence his or her claims that the initial statement was
obtained under duress, this claim, by itself, is not sufficient to
invalidate his confession.
122
Many non-governmental organizations acknowledge that such
118. Gomez Esprin Case, supra note 114, at Annex I.
119. 472 S.J.F. App. 818 (1917-1988) (Mex) ("Cuando el confesante aporta ninguna
prueba para justificar su aserto de que fue objeto de violencia por parte de alguno de los
organos del esatdo, su declaraci6n es insuficiente para hacer perder a su confesi6n inicial el
requisito de espontaneidad necesaria a su validez legal.") In the United States, of course,
the voluntariness of a confession must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence.
120. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (IIl), U.N. GAOR
3d Sess., at art. 11 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 62, at art. 11 (1).
121. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE: TORTURE,
"DISAPPEARANCES," AND EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION IN MEXICO 39-42 (1999)
[hereinafter SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE].
122. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE, supra note 28,
at 4.
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confessions are extracted using illegal methods such as torture
during the initial investigation period.
In short, the Mexican judiciary has abdicated its responsibility
as the arbiter of justice. This abdication has exacerbated the
structural defects in the Mexican criminal justice system. Without
judicial sanctions on torture, the police, who by and large are
untrained, have no incentive to cease use of illegal methods of
information gathering. Furthermore, such sanctions are needed to
pressure Public Prosecutors who oversee the police forces in order
to forgo this economical method of resolving cases.
C. Evaluating Recent Judicial Reforms
Although President Zedillo's promised reform of the
judiciary upon taking office in 1994, the efforts made have been
principally administrative, superficial, and have failed to make the
judiciary more effective and independent. In its 1998 Report, the
IACHR concluded that:
[N]otwithstanding the progress achieved, the executive branch
retains its excessive legal and extralegal powers over the judicial
branch. As long as this situation lasts, it will be impossible for
Mexico to have fully independent and impartial courts, despite
the existence of a constitutional system based on a balance of
powers and despite the international treaties signed by Mexico
which expressly provide for an independent judiciary. 123
There is no hard evidence of Government commitment to a
system of genuine checks and balances. The reform efforts of the
Zedillo Administration fail to address crucial structural
impediments to judicial independence. 124
One belated attempt at reform was a change in the selection
process of federal judges and secretaries. Previously, political
patronage served as the primary means of competitive
examination. 125  Although welcome, the lack of information
available to the public about the new selection process makes it
impossible to determine how this new process actually works.
Other attempts at reform were primarily administrative and
123. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 1, para. 56, supra note 18.
124. For a general discussion on the World Bank programs' limitations in this regard,
see HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 86, at 6.
125. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION ACT, art. 112 (1995) (Mex.); see also
Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 1, at para. 44, supra note 18.
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organizational in nature. To date, although well received, the
attempts at reform have done little to reduce the bureaucracy and
delay experienced by defendants at the trial level. For example,
one reform created a Federal Judiciary Council (Consejo Federal
de la Judicatura) to oversee the federal courts and their
administration, shifting this duty away from the Supreme Court
(except for the Supreme Court, which still administers itself).
126
The principal reason for the creation of the this Council was to
follow World Bank recommendations and other models of judicial
reform in Latin America, which appear to relieve the backlog of
cases in other countries. 127 The reasoning behind this reform
suggests that the integrity of the judiciary is questionable. "The
law shall lay the foundations for the training and refresher training
of public officials, which shall be governed by the principles of
excellence, objectivity, impartiality, professionalism, and
independence.' 28 The Council shall appoint circuit and district
court judges according to a set of objective criteria.129 Yet, there is
insufficient public information regarding these criteria, and it is
still too early to evaluate how these appointments will be affected
in practice.
Another reform stipulates a reduction in the number of
Supreme Court ministers, or justices, from 21 to 11, and a
reduction in the number of specialized panels (salas) for
administrative hearings from four to two.130 This touted solution,
however, does not actually resolve the problem for the partisan
126. The amendment to Article 100 of the Mexican Constitution states: "The
administration, oversight, and discipline of the judicial branch of the Federation, with the
exception of the Supreme Court of Justice, shall be the responsibility of the Federal
Council of the Judicature, as provided by law and in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution." CONST. art 100 (amended 1995) (Mex.).
127. "Judicial independence requires a transparent and merit-based appointment
system. Such a system could involve a judicial council which participates in the process."
DAKOLIAS, supra note 2, at xii.
128. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 398, supra note 18.
129. Paragraph 2 of Article 100 provides:
The Council shall comprise seven members, one of whom shall be the President
of the Supreme Court of Justice, who shall also preside over the Council; one
judge from the collegiate circuit courts; one judge from the single judge circuit
courts, and one district judge, who shall be elected by ballot; and two members
appointed by the Senate and one by the President of the Republic. The latter
three members of the Council shall be individuals who have distinguished
themselves through their ability, honesty and integrity in the field of the law.
CONST., art. 100 (amended 1995). See also arts. 95(b), 97.
130. Id. art. 94.
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nature of the Supreme Court. This becomes clear upon a close
inspection of the reforms. This reform required two-thirds
approval by the Senate, as opposed to a simple majority to confirm
the appointment of a Supreme Court justice. Nonetheless, the
reform allows the President to appoint a justice to an open seat if
his candidates are rejected by the Senate on two successive
occasions. Therefore, in practice, this reform made little progress
toward an objective, non-partisan appointment procedure. The
IACHR 1998 report states that "the system under which the
President nominates candidates for confirmation by the Senate
does not appear to be conducive to the proper functioning of an
open, competitive system with due checks and balances on the
selection process."'
131
Another reform changed the life term of a Supreme Court
justice to one non-renewable term of fifteen years. The
Administration's claims of de-politicization were further undercut
when President Zedillo began the reform process by firing all of
the current justices on the Supreme Court in order to select his
own candidates.132 Through this reform, the Court became more
susceptible, rather than less susceptible to political influence.
In theory, many reforms authorize the Supreme Court to
strike down laws as unconstitutional (acciones de
inconstitucionalidad) if eight justices concur. Such reform purports
to go beyond the amparo, which allows individuals exemptions
from unconstitutional laws. However, such judicial review cannot
occur unless one-third of Congress, one-third of a state congress,
or the Attorney General requests review by the Supreme Court
and a petition is filed within thirty days of the passage of that law.
These strict requirements upon acciones de inconstitucionalidad
virtually eliminate the possibility of using this theoretically
important new procedure. 1
33
A thirty-day period is rarely long enough to become aware of
and formulate a constitutional challenge to a law. Further, the
constitutionality of a law should not depend on the time elapsed
131. See Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 1, para. 41, supra note 18.
132. "Decreto mediante el cual se declaran reformados los articulos 21, 55, 73, 76, 79,
89, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 11, 116, 122 y
123 de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos," D.O., 31 de diciembre
de 1994 (Mex.) (providing for the current justices to "conclude their functions at the entry
into force" of said decree, i.e., January 1, 1995).
133. CONST. art. 105 (Mex.).
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since enactment. Moreover, while the Attorney General who is in
the employ of the Executive is almost certain not to raise a
constitutional challenge and the one-third of a legislative body
required to do so is also unlikely. "With the current political
realities of Mexican politics, the restriction on who may initiate a
challenge and the thirty-day time limit virtually guarantees that
[this] procedure will only be used in a political struggle between
government branches [and] is not likely to be used.., to elicit a
carefully reasoned decision about the constitutionality of a
controversial statute." 134 The progress which this constitutional
reform potentially represents could be consolidated by the
introduction of a system that permits true popular action. That is,
a system under which any citizen would be entitled to recourse to
the competent bodies for review of laws which they claim violate
their human rights and under which such laws were thereby
subject to general repeal or nullification. 135  Finally, the
requirement that eight justices concur with respect to a law's
unconstitutionality is a "high requirement by universal standards
of comparative law."
136
In addition to the general ineffectiveness of the reforms
discussed above, attempts to police the judiciary have been
improperly targeted at personal corruption rather than at
structural abuses in the process where they should be focused.
The U.S. State Department reports that between 1995 and 1997:
[S]even judges have been investigated for the alleged protection
they granted to criminals, including drug traffickers. Some of
these judges are accused of having abused the amparo... to
benefit the accused criminals. Other judges face investigations
for the lenient sentences they handed down in specific cases of
serious crimes.
137
134. Taylor, supra note 72, at 163; cf Vargas, supra note 2, at 312.
135. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 1b, para. 108, supra note 18.
136. In countries of the western hemisphere, as in European countries, in order to
declare a law unconstitutional, the majority of the members of the Supreme Court or the
supervisory institution under the constitution is required. See generally ALLAN BREWER
CARfAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW (1985). In its comments on this
report, the Mexican Government argued that the provision requiring a special majority of
eight magistrates to declare a law unconstitutional "gives Mexicans the security that the
decision made is absolutely irrefutable, and there is no possibility of deceit. In this regard,
Mexican is in the vanguard." Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. lb, para. 108, supra note 18.
137. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN
MEXICO FOR 1997 §1(e) (Jan. 30, 1998).
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To uphold the law and protect individuals' rights, these
enforcement measures seem off the mark, and at best inadequate.
Investigations should focus on abuse of individuals' rights, such as
failure to report evidence of torture under the Federal Law to
Prevent and Punish Torture; but, instead, improperly focuses
purely on leniency on crime.138 For its part, the State Department
completely ignores the fact that the Public Prosecutor's Office
often uses the investigations of judges in a politicized manner to
punish judges that act independently or issue amparos against the
wishes of the prosecution. The Mexican Government needs to
commit to the structural reforms necessary to reduce human rights
violations and hold judges accountable for their role in the
infringement of civil liberties.
In sum, the judiciary in Mexico has become all too politicized
by and subservient to the executive branch due to its structural
weakness. The judiciary structure is rife with cronyism and
corruption, and judges play a central role in the institutionalization
of torture as a means of extracting confessions by admitting
tainted evidence into trial proceedings. Recent judicial reforms by
the Zedillo Administration generally fail to provide the judiciary
with true independence. To achieve successful reform, party
detachment, individual autonomy, and political insularity must be
implemented. This requires a broad program of reform including
making the judiciary accountable for the human rights abuses.
Without such reform, the credibility and stature of the judiciary
will continue to erode. The Zedillo Administration has made
largely administrative changes and disciplined judges not for
complicity in human rights abuse but for leniency in sentencing.139
V. EVALUATING RECENT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORMS FROM
A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
While critics focus on the application of the laws, a series of
recent constitutional and legislative reforms that whittle away
defendants' legal rights shows there is a problem with the laws
themselves. 140 Rather than increasing the efficiency and integrity
138. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE, supra note 121, at 50.
139. For a general discussion on Latin American judiciaries, see HALFWAY TO
REFORM, supra note 86, at 6.
140. Note that previous 1990 legal reforms were aimed at strengthening human rights
guarantees, and that more recent measures reflect a dangerous change of course.
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of the judicial system, the Government undertook a series of legal
reforms to endow its notoriously corrupt law enforcement agents
and prosecutors with far greater discretion and power, especially
during pre-trial detention and for the purpose of indictment
standards. In addition, these reforms have restricted defendants'
remedies against the ineffectiveness of counsel. Such criminal
procedure changes threaten the legalization of arbitrary and illicit
actions by public officials in the police forces and Public
Prosecutor's office. Clearly, the laws should not be changed to
conform to the reprehensible conduct of public officials.141
A. Pre-Trial Detention
A defendant's right not to be arbitrarily detained has recently
been eroded by powers given to the police and the Public
Prosecutor's office. The 1994 reforms expanded the authority of
the Public Prosecutor to issue "summons" or "detention orders,"
which are only nominally distinct from arrest warrants and which
prevent the defendant from immediately challenging the detention
before a court. Moreover, the 1998 reforms expanded the concept
of in flagrante delicto to allow the police almost unlimited
discretion in detaining persons without having to seek warrants
from a judicial authority. Both police and prosecutors discretion
to hold suspected criminals without prompt judicial review should
be restricted. In addition, Mexico's laws should be brought into
compliance with international human rights standards.
Since, torture is often committed during the initial
investigation phase, it is easy to see how reforms that were
implemented during the Salinas Administration and the beginning
of the Zedillo Administration, which extended the detention
period permitted before bringing a detainee before a judge, have
actually facilitated torture in practice. 142 These changes are
contrary to the spirit of international law, which requires that,
"Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law
to exercise judicial power." 143
Before the reforms of January 1994, the only public authority,
141. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE, supra note 121, at 46-47;
see also LEGALIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD, supra note 4, at 9.
142. CONST. art. 16 (Mex.).
143. G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 62, at art. 9(3).
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according to Article 16 of the Constitution, which could order the
arrest or detention of a person was a judge. With the reforms, the
Public Prosecutor can issue "summons" or "detention warrants,"
which ostensibly are not the equivalent of arrest warrants. Yet the
distinction remains theoretical. In accordance with the reforms to
Article 16, a detention can be ordered by a non- judicial authority
under the following circumstances: "in urgent cases dealing with
felonies... and having established a risk of flight of the accused, if
and only if the [Public Prosecutor] cannot appear before a judge
because of time, place or circumstantial restraints." 144 In other
words, the Constitution now allows wide latitude for the Public
Prosecutor to issue detention warrants as he wishes. It is enough
that the Public Prosecutor be dealing with a felony, that there be a
risk of flight, and that there be "time, place or circumstantial
constraints."
The requirement of obtaining a warrant from an impartial
judicial authority is important because it provides for an ex ante
record of the facts upon which the equivalent of probable cause
can be based. When police can act without warrants, or when
warrants are issued by prosecutors without the benefit of ex ante
judicial review, this determination must rely on the officer's
testimony, which leaves room for such a determination to be based
on few and more circumstantial facts.
In the past, Public Prosecutors frequently issued orders for
detention, but they were unconstitutional practices that could be
remedied through an amparo suit. Before these reforms, Article
16 was very clear in establishing that "only in cases of emergency
where there is no judicial authority available" could the Public
Prosecutor order the detention of a defendant. 145 The Public
Prosecutor bore the burden of demonstrating that no judicial
authority was objectively available. Otherwise such detention was
illegal and the defendant could be freed pursuant to an amparo
proceeding. Thus the effect, if not the explicit aim, of this
Constitutional reform was to legitimize the practice of Public
Prosecutors issuing the equivalent of arrest warrants. According
to Mexican jurist, Ignacio Burgoa, this power "opens the door to
unlimited actions by administrative authorities... to limit personal
144. CONST. art. 16 (Mex.).
145. See CONST. art. (amended 1992) (Mex.).
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liberties." 1
46
Moreover, in the face of this newly-legitimized omnipotence
of the Public Prosecutor's office, the detainee has no judicial
recourse because the Law of Amparo was also amended in 1994.
Previously, in cases where there was no judicial order of detention,
notification of this breach on the part of the authorities
responsible compelled such authorities either to free the detainee
or to charge him within 24 hours, regardless of which authority had
detained the individual. This is the classic case for the use of
habeus corpus. The ICCPR states clearly that, "anyone who is
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful."
147
Subsequent to the amendments of January 10, 1994, an
individual detained without a judicially issued warrant by an
authority other than the Public Prosecutor (i.e., any police force)
was required to be brought before the Public Prosecutor "without
delay". This would allow the Prosecutor to determine whether the
defendant was to be freed or charged within 48 hours. That is to
say, regardless of how many days the detainee is held by the
police, the individual can be, and generally is, detained for another
forty-eight hours by the Public Prosecutor before being either
freed or charged. 148 Moreover, Article 19 of the Constitution
provides that detention by a judicial authority may not exceed
seventy-two hours without a formal indictment being issued. Such
detention must be preceded by showing that sufficient evidence
exists about the act allegedly committed to permit it to be
characterized as a crime and the evidence points toward the
accused as the perpetrator. 149 Thus, in total, a suspect may be held
first by the police for an undefined period, and then for another
120 hours before the equivalent of probable cause is
determined.15
0
A 1998 reform of Article 193 of the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure enlarged the concept of in flagrante delicto in order to
allow the detention of perpetrators of felonies within 48 hours
146. HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE, supra note 121, at 49.
147. G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 62, at art. 9(4).
148. In cases involving organized crime, this period extends to 96 hours.
149. See CONST. art. 19 (Mex.).
150. See Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 356, supra note 18.
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after commission of a crime. Under this reform, detention is
allowed not only when a suspect is caught in the act, or is caught in
"hot pursuit," fleeing the crime scene, but also in the following
circumstances: when the suspect is identified by the victim, a
witness, or a co-conspirator; or if the object, instrument, or
product of the crime is found in the suspect's possession; or when
there are fundamental indications of the suspect's participation in
the crime.151 In these cases, the Pubic Prosecutor is empowered to
issue detention warrants for the accused. This proposal is contrary
to any common-sense notion of in flagrantM or even quasi-in
flagrante detention. Essentially, the proposal permits the Public
Prosecutor's office to detain a suspect within the 48-hour period
following the crime, and then investigate the circumstances
surrounding the crime while the suspect is in custody.
Under the 1998 reform, simply indicating a person's guilt for
committing a certain crime would be enough to open an initial
investigation and permit arrest of that person within 48 hours.
Arbitrary detentions would, in effect, be legalized. The mere fact
of having a stolen object in one's possession within 48 hours of a
crime, for example, could allow for allegations that that person
came into possession of the object while committing a crime and,
therefore, that person could be held under the notion of in
flagrante delicto. The protections of Articles 14, 16 and 20 of the
Constitution refer to personal liberty, conditions for detention and
due process before an impartial tribunal, these would be rendered
nugatory. 152
There were, of course, alternatives to this proposed expansion
of the notion of in flagrante delicto. If, upon discovering that a
suspect was in possession of an object, instrument, or product of a
crime, the Public Prosecutor could immediately apply for an arrest
warrant, and the judge could issue an arrest warrant within a
matter of hours. This alternative would not have violated any
constitutional norms and would increase the efficiency of the
system. 153 In contrast, the 1998 reform presumes the inefficiency
of the police and Public Prosecutors to compensate for their
standard of conduct, and would lower the legal threshold for
151. Note that this reform is only applicable to felonies; see C.F.P.P., art. 193(111)
(1998); see also LEGALIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD, supra note 4, at 9.
152. See id. at 7.
153. See id. at 8.
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detention.
B. The Right to Counsel
Both non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations
repeatedly assert that the lack of access to effective representation
in Mexico is a significant factor that perpetuates human rights
abuses. During the preliminary investigation phase, suspects are
perhaps most in need of legal assistance. In theory, lawyers'
participation at this stage not only facilitates preparation of the
defense to be presented at trial, but also reduces the incidence of
torture, forced confessions, and other police abuses.154 The report
by U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture, P. Kooijmans, for the
period of 47 sessions of the Human Rights Commission in January
1991, noted that, particularly in Mexico, was facilitated by the
absence of a defense attorney during the first hours or sometimes
days of detention and the importance placed on obtaining
confessions as evidence. 155
The presence of counsel at the preliminary hearing or
investigation phase assures due process to the accused in a variety
of ways. Theoretically, through defense counsel's cross-
examination of the state's witnesses, the judge may conclude that
the state lacks the equivalent of probable cause. Additionally, a
defense lawyer can use the preliminary hearing to examine the
state's case against his client and make preparations for the
instruction phase of the judicial process. In Mexico, a competent
defense counsel can be influential at the preliminary hearing in
arguing not only for bail, but also for a physical or psychiatric
examination that can provide strong evidence of torture or police
154. See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO
REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 38 (1996).
155. See Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/17
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur]. In contrast,
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires the right to counsel be available at
all "critical stages" in the criminal prosecution, i.e., at any stage where substantial rights of
the accused could be damaged "by counsel's absence." Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 132
(1967). The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, held that any identification procedures,
such as police or prosecutor attempts to elicit inculpatory statements from the accused,
first appearances, in arraignment or preliminary hearing, where determinations made
there can later be used against the defendant, and sentencing, may constitute such "critical
stages." Id.
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abuse.
In 1991, partly in response to the Special Rapporteur's report
and other critiques, the Government passed the Federal Law to
Prevent and Punish Torture. The Government also introduced
significant changes to the federal and Federal District Codes of
criminal procedure. Specifically, Articles 128 and 269 of the
Federal and Federal District codes for criminal procedures,
respectively, state that when the accused makes a statement, he
should be notified of his right to not make a statement. 156 These
changes in the Federal and Federal District Codes were intended
to deny the validity of a statement made without the presence of a
public defendef or a "person of the defendant's confidence"
(usually a family member).
Superficially, these reforms appear to represent a substantial
improvement in defendants' rights. Practice shows, however, that
the reforms may actually have been a step backwards in combating
torture. Perhaps the most serious flaw in both Section II of Article
20 of the Constitution and in the Federal and Federal District
Penal Codes is the presumption of the validity of any statement
given in the presence of a public defender.
In reality, most detainees are not allowed to speak to anyone,
much less a lawyer. If the detainee is able to locate a family
member to act as a "person of confidence," the detainee is not
given more time to find a lawyer. Often the "person of
confidence" is a stranger to the defendant, someone who happens
to be down the hall from the Public Prosecutor's office. Even
more frequently, the person of confidence exists only on paper: a
name written into the proceedings when the public defender was
not actually present during the sessions or during their entirety. 157
Amnesty notes in its 1997 Country Report on Mexico that,
"Lawyers working for the State are inadequately prepared, badly
paid, with few resources assigned to them, and severely
overworked [and] [a] lack of independence from the courts
seriously undermines their impartiality." 158  Even more
discouraging is that when the public defender is physically present,
he rarely distinguishes himself from any other prosecutor, even
156. See C.F.P.P. F. arts. 128; 269 (amended 1991).
157. For a discussion of egregious abuses in the appointment of persons of confidence,
see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE, supra note 121, at 35-36.
158. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE, supra note 28,
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joining in the questioning of the accused. A typical example
occurred in a case that came before the Second District Judge in
Criminal Matters, in Toluca, State of Mexico. 159 In a March 3,
1997 hearing before the judge, Perla Gabriela Villegas, the
ostensible "public defender," who was supposedly representing the
defendants, admitted that during the initial investigation phase of
the case, she had, in fact, been doing her obligatory social service
for the Office of the Public Prosecutor, by "helping the Prosecutor
in any need.' 160 The address and other information that Villegas
provided for the original record were false.161 In practice then, the
right to not make a statement or to have an efficient and adequate
defense is not guaranteed. Reforms in the criminal procedure
codes only create the appearance of such a right.
In practice, public defenders are often so incompetent,
overworked, and thoroughly corrupt that even the poorest of
citizens will opt for a private lawyer. These private lawyers,
sometimes referred to as coyotes, however, are often equally
corrupt, charging their clients exorbitant sums for bribes or for
services they did not perform. For instance, the private lawyer will
boast to the client that he obtained subpoenas for witnesses and
require the client to pay a large fee. The subpoenas, however,
mean little and cost nothing. Or the lawyer, like the pettifogging
Huld in Kafka's novel, will exact money from the client in order to
have lunch with the judge in the case, telling the client that the
lunch is essential for a favorable disposition. When these private
lawyers are present during the defendant's initial declaration
(declaraci6n preparatoria), they are no more likely than public
defenders to counsel the detainee to remain silent or to refrain
from answering the questions of the Public Prosecutor.
A study carried out by the Assembly of Representatives of
the Federal District (Asamblea de Representantes del Distrito
Federal) and the Human Rights Commission for the Federal
District (Comision de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal
(CDHDF)) analyzed how the problems in obtaining effective
representation have hampered attempts to eliminate human rights
violations. The report produced from the study proposed the
159. See Statements made at hearing on March 3, 1997 (Hearing No. 82/96) (transcripts
on file with author).
160. Id.
161. See id. These facts were only brought to light because Pilar Noriega assumed the
defense of the accused.
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creation of a decentralized organization to oversee training and
monitoring of the city's lawyers. 162 Thus far, no such organization
has been created.
Under international law-both that based on treaties and that
based on the practice of nations-the right to counsel implies the
effective assistance of counsel. In the United States, for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the purpose of the right
to counsel, "assur[ing] fairness in the adversary process," requires
the defendant to have counsel that acts as his zealous advocate and
subjects the State's case to the "crucible of meaningful adversary
testing."'16
3
In Mexico, the perversion of the right to counsel is
particularly serious because ineffectiveness of counsel is not
considered a government violation of the rights of the accused and
therefore, does not give rise to an amparo proceeding (juicio de
garantias).164 This result flows from the fact that the Law of
Amparo, often the only practical mechanism of enforcing the
defendant's ability to redress his rights, has not been reformed in
accordance with the changes in the codes of criminal procedure.
The result is absurd. Article 159 of the Law of Amparo indicates
that in civil, administrative, and labor cases that are appealed, it is
a violation of the procedural guarantees for a party to be falsely or
inadequately represented and this gives rise to a cause of action for
amparo.165 Astoundingly, however, the analogous clause does not
exist for criminal trials despite the fact that Article 14 of the
Constitution provides for due process of law.
Article 14 refers to the "necessary formalities of the
proceeding," but commentators have generally concluded that
162. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS REGARDING TORTURE, supra note
28, at 5.
163. Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court
articulated a two-pronged test to determining whether a defendant's representation had
been constitutionally ineffective; to satisfy this test, the defendant must show: (1)
incompetence on the part of counsel that (2) results in prejudice to his defense. The
finding of such ineffectiveness would be made on appeal. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,670 (1984).
164. "Suarez, Jose Medina," 12 S.J.F. 81 (6a 6poca). "La inactividad del defensor
durante el proceso no es acto atribuible a las autoridades que pueda reparase en el juicio de
garantias." Id.
165. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF AMPARO LAW, supra note 84, at 33-33A (discussing
art. 159, which provides that, in civil, administrative or labor suits, procedural rules and
the interests of the plaintiff shall be considered to be violated when the plaintiff has
received a false or inadequate representation).
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these only include the right to raise points in the defense, and the
right to be heard (garantia de audiencia).166 Yet, a declaration by
the accused that the public defender failed to provide adequate
representation is deemed irrelevant in applying for an amparo.
According to the Supreme Court, it is not within the judiciary's
power to analyze the form or terms of a defense, but only to see
that every defendant gets a "proper," i.e., paper, defense in
accordance with the Constitution.
167
In short, reforms ostensibly mandating the presence of
defense attorneys during the initial stages of investigation, when
torture most frequently occurs, have accomplished little except
they ensure the automatic validity of the defendant's statements.
Such is the result even if defense counsel was present in name
only, with the defendant having been deprived of the benefit of his
constitutional protections. Moreover, the failure to amend the
amparo law to provide for redress in the event of ineffectiveness of
counsel increasingly leaves defendants with no recourse against
such abuses in the process.
C. Prosecutorial Powers
The lack of redress for ineffective counsel must exist in the
context of recent reforms that decreased the independence of the
Public Prosecutor's Office and systematically granted more powers
to that office relative to the judiciary and defense counsel. In its
1998 Report, the IACHR highlighted:
[T]he series of reforms in which the Office of the Public
Prosecutor appears to have been granted a range of powers that
exceed the functions of an investigative organ and in which that
representative of society plays the role of official, party and
judge, thereby weakening the defense and subjecting the court
to the rhythm and requirements of the prosecutorial side.
168
166. See CONST. art. 14 (Mex.) (commentary by Rodolfo Cartas Sosa, Patricia Cano
Vargas and Jose Antonio Bunt Castro).
167. See 58 S.J.F. 21 (7a dpoca 1969).
La afirmaci6n del acusado en el sentido de que el defensor de oficio no actu6
correctamente, procurando la absoluci6n de su defensa, es intranscendente para
fundamentar sentencia de amparo, toda vez que no es facultad jurisdiccional el
analizar la forma y t6rminos de la defensa, sino solamente vigilar el que todo
inculpado tenga una defensa de conformidad con nuestra Ley Suprema.
Id.
168. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 383, supra note 18.
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Through the reforms enacted under the Zedillo
Administration, the presumption of innocence has been steadily
eroded, while the standard of proof for indictment in criminal
cases has increasingly become indistinguishable in practice from
the standard used for conviction. Ultimately, recent reforms have
converted the Public Prosecutor into a de facto instructional judge.
Under Mexican law, the Public Prosecutor's Office is
supposed to play a more neutral role in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes than in common law systems. In practice,
however, the reverse is true. Article 21 of the Constitution
indicates that the prosecution of crimes is the sole responsibility of
the Public Prosecutor and the Judicial Police, who are under the
authority and immediate command of the former.169 With respect
to federal jurisdiction, Article 102 of the Constitution specifies that
the federal Public Prosecutor merely has the power to prosecute
federal crimes and, to this end, to obtain arrest warrants against
the accused and to search for and present evidence to determine
responsible parties for given crimes.
170
The need for independence from the political influence of the
Executive Branch, and impartiality in the Public Prosecutor's
Office has been repeatedly stressed both Mexican and
international commentators. In its 1998 Report, the IACHR
noted that:
As far back as in the Second Latin American Colloquium and
First Mexican Congress on Procedural Law, which were held in
Mexico City in February 1960, a proposition was adopted by
acclamation to the effect that: "The Office of the Public
Prosecutor must be an organ independent of the executive
branch and must have the attributes of irremovability and other
constitutional guarantees afforded to members of the judicial
branch." Hector Fix-Zamudio himself has described this
independence of the Office of the Public Prosecutor as being
"indispensable". 1
71
Yet, recent legal reforms in Mexico have greatly decreased the
independence and autonomy of the Public Prosecutor.
On April 30, 1994, then President Salinas created the so called
Office for the Coordination of Public Security in the Nation, which
169. See CONST. art. 21 (Mex.).
170. See id. at art. 102.
171. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 373, supra note 18.
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included the Federal Attorney General's Office (i.e., the Federal
Public Prosecutor) as a department within the Office of the
President of the Republic. 172 A General Law establishing the
basis for coordination of the public security system was later
passed under President Zedillo in 1995.173 Mexican jurist Ignacio
Burgoa Orihuela argues that the placement of the Public
Prosecutor's Office within the Office for the Coordination of
National Public Security has meant that "in practice it has become
an office under the public administration, contrary to the
provisions of the Mexican Constitution itself.
'174
As the Public Prosecutor's Office, at least at the federal level,
becomes more politicized, the procedural reforms passed under
the Zedillo Administration go far toward enlarging the purview of
the Public Prosecutor's office into what has traditionally been the
judiciary's role. The most significant of the 1994 reforms to the
Federal and Federal District Codes of Criminal Procedure
conferred on the Public Prosecutor all of the judicial faculties
necessary to order and carry out all acts leading to the proof of the
elements of the crime (comprobaci6n de elementos de tipo penal),
and the demonstration of probable guilt of the accused.
Additionally, the Prosecutor was assigned the responsibility of
guaranteeing the protection of individual rights (bien juridico
protegido).175 Thus, the Public Prosecutor must not only collect
evidence of the crime, but also must determine the extent of
involvement of the defendant, and the wanton or intentional
nature of the alleged act or omission. It is also the Public
Prosecutor's responsibility to verify the circumstances of time and
place, as well as the subjective elements and "other circumstances
that the law provides for."
176
In other words, both the validity of the evidence and the
weight it is accorded are now largely determined in the initial
investigation phase by the Public Prosecutor's Office rather than
during the Instructions Phase of the trial process, where the
defendant would have the opportunity to present his defense
before a judge. Under international human rights law, judgments
of criminal culpability are made after a public hearing before an
172. See id. at para. 374.
173. See id. at para. 375.
174. Id. at para. 379.
175. See C.F.P.P. art. 168; C.P.P.D.F. art. 122 (amended 1994).
176. C.P.P.D.F. art. 122 (amended 1994).
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independent and impartial court. For example, the ICCPR states:
"In the determination of any criminal charge against him...
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by
law." 177  Through these reforms, which virtually move
determinations of guilt or innocence into the purview of the Public
Prosecutor, Mexican criminal procedure law is backsliding
dangerously in terms of compliance with international standards of
due process.
The 1999 reform of Article 16 would further empower the
government by only requiring the Public Prosecutor to
demonstrate the "probable existence of the objective elements of
the crime" and the "probable responsibility of the accused." This
lower standard would subject defendants to even greater vagaries
by the Public Prosecutor and effectively leave them with no
remedy. On the effects of this change, one group of human rights
experts commented:
[I]t would be wrong to believe that the way to resolve the very
serious and intolerable problem of public insecurity.., is
precisely to create a new cause of public insecurity, which is
what would result from reducing through these reforms
constitutional guarantees that protect citizens in general from
authorities.
178
The "Miguel Agustfn Pro Juirez" Human Rights Center
articulated its concern with respect to this lending more power to
the Public Prosecutor:
The generalized and evident corruption in the [Public
Prosecutor's Office] has given rise to the lack of credibility in its
function, due to the terrible facility with which charges are
prefabricated and initial investigations are manulated in order
to have absolute control over the proceeding.
17
The concomitant effect of giving greater discretion and power
to the Public Prosecutor is increased ambiguity in judicial practice.
In practice, judges and magistrates would be able to rely on this
lower "probable" standard in indictments and even in the
177. G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 62, at art. 14(1).
178. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE, supra note 121, at 51
(comments by the Citizens' Legislative Proposal Workshop) (footnote and citation
omitted).
179. See LEGALIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD, supra note 4, at 2.
[Vol. 21:467
Mexican Transition to Democracy
conclusions phase of trials. 180
A 1993 reform of Article 19 required that, for an indictment
(auto de formal prisi6n), all of the elements of the crime, as well as
the probable culpability of the accused, must be clearly
demonstrated. A March 1999 reform requires only "objective"
elements to be plainly demonstrated (cuerpo del delito), while
subjective elements, such as intent, need only be demonstrated to
become probable. This would inject tremendous uncertainty and
confusion into trial practice because "objective" elements are not
defined, nor even mentioned, in the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure. 181 It also leans toward contradiction of one of the most
basic tenets of internationally recognized due process: the right of
the defendant to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
182
Again, recent reforms go even further than previous reforms.
According to the 1997 amendments to Article 286 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for the Federal District and Article 145 of the
Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, the initial proceedings allow
the public prosecutors and judicial police to act as fact-finder,
judge and jury. They may do this so long as, " they abide by the
rules of the [respective] Code." As a result, the right not to
incriminate oneself or not to confess cannot be respected in
practice because the detainee is essentially judged before he can
stand before the court. Coupled with the recent March 1999
constitutional reforms, these provisions leave the principle of
presumed innocence badly eviscerated.
In short, the rule of law requires a true division of power and
a system of checks and balances among the branches of
government. This can only occur with the presence of an effective
and independent judiciary. In the constitutional debates of 1917, it
was clear the role of the Public Prosecutor's office was to carry out
the prosecution and preliminary investigation of crimes. Today,
the Public Prosecutor usurps many judicial responsibilities,
including ordering pre-trial detention and weighing evidence in the
process of determining levels of culpability. All this added
responsibility while the judiciary remains hamstrung and
ineffective. The IACHR noted in its 1998 report that "coercive
180. See id.
181. See C.F.F.P. art. 168
182. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), supra note 120,
at art. 11; G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 62, art. 14 (2).
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
power over persons for purposes of instituting legal proceedings
which, as provided for in Article 20 of the Constitution, resides
only with the judicial authority from which the Office of the Public
Prosecutor is separated by the constitutional principle of the
separation of powers." 183 Yet, the 1994 and 1998 reforms, coupled
with the most recent 1999 reforms, dramatically curtail the right of
due process; the right to be heard by a judge in a competent,
independent, and impartial court; the right to be presumed
innocent with full equality before the law; and the right to pursue
legal remedies. 184 All of the reforms discussed above represent a
step backwards for Mexico in terms of bringing its criminal
procedure laws and practice into compliance with international
human rights standards.
Moreover, as the "Miguel Agustfn Pro Judrez" Human Rights
Center notes, the continuous undertaking of constitutional reforms
itself is troubling from the perspective of the rule of law:
These frequent reforms of constitutional norms lead us to note
that the reform initiatives proposed by the Executive have
never been subject to an effective debate that would permit an
in-depth analysis, but rather have until now been approved
almost automatically.... The casual manner in which
constitutional norms have been reformed paces in grave doubt
juridical stability, which should be a fundamental characteristic
of the rule of law and of a democracy.
185
Unfortunately, the tradition of the executive rewriting rights in the
name of political expedience is a fundamental threat to the rule of
law.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite significant advances toward political pluralism,
Mexico cannot hope to be a true democracy without entrenching
the rule of law. Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor for
the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda and Justice of the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, stated in an address at Stanford Law School in 1997:
There is no element of a democratic and open society more
essential to its well-being that the rule of law. This, more than
183. Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. 5, para. 385, supra note 18.
184. See LEGLIZAR LA ARBITRARIEDAD, supra note 4, at 4.
185. Id. at 1.
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all else is the dividing line between freedom and despotism
which has taken some of its most sophisticated forms of
repressive cruelty in this century. The administration and
application of the rule of law by principled, independent
adjudicators and officers of the court... are inextricably bound
up with the idea itself.
186
At this pivotal moment in its history, Mexico risks sliding
ineluctably into full-fledged despotism if serious reforms in the
administration of justice are not undertaken. Democratization
must be accompanied by implementation of the rule of law at the
micro and macro levels. Yet, as political, economic and social
tensions grow, the Government has responded with authoritarian
reforms derived from its narrow focus on public security and a
stable environment for narrowly construed economic investment
and development. This results in the Government investing far
more in instruments of social control and security, and less in
social services that might alleviate the underlying causes of much
of the violence.
187
Within the criminal justice system itself, it is clear that despite
the fact that the Constitution was a model for rights accorded to
criminal defendants, the administration of justice falls far short of
the ideal enshrined in Mexico's Magna Carta. Franz Kafka's
famous novel, The Trial, might just as well describe the real story
of many criminal defendants in Mexico, who have found
themselves entangled in a surreal nightmare not of their making
and beyond their control. Charges are concocted by corrupt police
with virtually no training or investigative techniques. The accused
is often unaware and uninformed of the state of the proceedings,
and rarely receives adequate legal representation. At the same
time, judges, who feed on patronage, willfully ignore evidence of
official abuses.
The Zedillo Administration's response to the ineffective and
politicized judiciary did not seriously reform that institution.
Instead, the Administration instituted a series of largely cosmetic
and organizational reforms, which have failed to establish the
prerequisites for an impartial judiciary, which include, detachment
186. Richard Goldstone, Assessing the Work of the United Nations War Crime
Tribunals, 33 STAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
187. See MANUEL MORENO, La Seguridad Nacional desde la Perspectiva de la
Constituci6n, in CUADERNOS DE INVESTIGACIN (1987).
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from the dominant PRI, individual autonomy and political
insularity. Moreover, other legal reforms further weakened and
undermined the rule of law and the principle of separation of
powers by allowing the Public Prosecutor to usurp many of the
judiciary's functions.
On the eve of this historic presidential election in the year
2000, the Government must reverse the abrogation of individual
rights caused by recent reforms to the Constitution and Codes of
Criminal Procedure. It also must provide for remedies for
violations of rights under the Law of Amparo. Where Mexican
law departs from the country's obligations under the ICCPR, the
American Convention, the CAT and other international treaties, it
should be brought into compliance. Finally, on a macro-level, the
Government must evince a firm determination to return security
to civilian authorities accountable to the public and to ensure
accountability of those authorities. Police officers, prosecutors
and judges cannot be above the law. They must be prosecuted and
punished for abuses, or complicity in abuses. Lists of police
officers involved in .abuses should be fastidiously kept to prevent
future employment in other states or agencies. Above all, the
Government must possess the political will to establish a truly
independent judiciary and a credible system for the administration
of justice.
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